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This thesis adopts a two thronged approach to explore the two components of 
the common wisdom in Botswana. Firstly, it tests the claim by the common 
wisdom that Botswana is inherently homogeneous. That 90% of the population 
either speaks Setswana or belongs to Setswana speaking tribes. Secondly, it 
tests the fact that this perceived homogeneity connect to the country‘s 
democratic, economic and political success. The study uses existing 
Afrobarometer survey data drawn from Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) 
Afrobarometer survey data to test both claims about Botswana‘s homogeneity 
thesis. The findings of this study reveal that the first part of the common 
wisdom is confirmed especially when using language ―spoken most at 
home.‖However, it is disconfirmed when using ―home language.‖ It is also 
shown that when using tribe (a putatively objective) and social identity (a more 
subjective) dimension of ethnicity, the level of ethnic diversity in Botswana is 
much higher than the common wisdom suggests. This is more apparent when 
language and tribe are broken down according to district and rural-urban 
location. It seems that minority groups are distributed across and also 
concentrated in certain parts of the country. With regard to the second part of 
the common wisdom, the results point out that difference in language, tribe and 
social identity exist. However, these are not politicized and not aligned with key 
political factors of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, 
voting and government legitimacy. There are no important politically relevant 
cleavages structures in Botswana. This study concludes by proposing that, it 
may be this lack of politicization of identity, rather than the putative 
homogeneity of the country, that accounts for Botswana‘s record of 















1.1 Background to the Study 
 
The study of ethnic identity in stable and unstable political systems has in recent years 
occupied centre stage in the academic analysis of both developed and emerging 
democracies (Horowitz 1991; Glickman 1995; Mozaffar 1995; Jones 1997; Mattes 
1999; Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999; McClure 2001; Young 2002; Bannon, Miguel & 
Posner; Posner 2004a; Posner 2004b; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). It has 
also captured the attention of researchers interested in the study of democratic 
governance who focus on the relationship between ethnic identity and the key 
indicators such as national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting 
and legitimacy (Pye & Verba 1965; Nie & Verba 1975; Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; 
Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005).  
 
In this study, I explore the common wisdom that Botswana is one of the few 
ethnically homogeneous nation states in Africa. I also examine the extent to which the 
key political indicators of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, 
voting and legitimacy run parallel to language (a more objective), tribal affiliation (a 
putatively objective) and social identity (a more subjective) dimension of ethnic 
identity.  
 
As a stable democracy for almost five decades, Botswana provides an excellent 
setting for the study of ethnic identity. The choice of my topic: Ethnic Identity in a 
“Homogeneous” Nation State is motivated by the desire to subject the claim that 
Botswana is ethnically homogeneous to empirical study. I draw from several theories 
and models that seek to explain the influence of key indicators such as ethnic identity, 
national identity, interpersonal trust, social identity, political participation, voting and 
legitimacy on political attitudes and behaviors. I also draw on rational choice theory 
(Pye & Verba 1965; Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; Glickman 1995; Mozaffar 1995) and 















1.2 Research Problem 
 
A scholarly consensus, both within and outside the country, claims that Botswana is a 
homogeneous nation state, in fact one of a handful of true nation states on the 
continent (Hartland-Thunberg 1978; Picard 1987; Easterly & Levin 1997; Young 
2002; Norris & Mattes 2003; Solway 2004). It claims that it is this homogeneity 
which is responsible for its exceptional record of democratic stability and economic 
growth (Easterly & Levin 1997; Samatar 1997, 1999; Temple 1999; Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 2003; Taylor 2003; Bannon, Miguel & 
Posner 2004)
1
. This study seeks to subject both claims to empirical test. 
 
According to Young (2002), along with Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana, is one of 
the few countries in Africa that consists of a single ethnic group, thus making it 
homogeneous. It is generally thought that such social homogeneity, and the political 
consensus it brings are conducive to stable democratic environment (Mattes 1999). 
Scholars of Botswana routinely stress its common culture, language and descent 
(Berman 1998). Hartland-Thunberg
2
 for example, perceives Botswana as a tranquil 
and harmonious society consisting of eight main tribes, with a common language, 
namely, Setswana. Easterly and Levine (1997) conclude that Botswana is the least 
fractionalized and fragmented country in Africa with an Ethnolinguistic 
Fragmentation (ELF) score
3
 of .057. In contrast, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa and 
Nigeria are the most fractionalized and ethnically heterogeneous countries with scores 
of .650, .751, .856 and .87 respectively (Easterly & Levine 1997; Norris & Mattes 
2003).  
 
The notion of a homogeneous society connotes a single bounded, internal sameness 
and the absence of polarization, division and fragmentation of a culturally 
                                                 
1
 The literature cited here employed indices of ethnic fractionalization to account for outcomes such as 
economic growth. In other words, ethnic diversity is frequently used as a proxy for the salience of 
ethnic identity (Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004) 
2
 Hartland-Thunberg categorically listed the eight ‗major‘ tribes and did not mention the existence of 
other tribes not listed in the Botswana Constitution. The eight tribes are: Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, 
Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa. Incidentally these are all Tswana 
tribes. 
3
 The Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index measures the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals in a country belong to different Ethnolinguistic groups. The more groups there are, 
the higher ELF score (Easterly & Levine 1997; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 












homogeneous ethnic group (Berman 1998; Stranfield 1993). It is further claimed that 
this similarity in culture translates into commonality of interest and agreement on 
social identity and, especially, national identity. The literature on ethnicity tends to 
emphasize the ‗exceptionality‘ of Botswana within the wider context of sub-Saharan 
Africa (Easterly & Levine 1997; Samatar 1997, 1999; Solway 2002). In contrast to 
many of Africa‘s deeply divided societies where ethnic conflict is at the centre of 
politics, Botswana‘s politics is characterized by relative peace, stable democracy and 
economic growth largely seen as the ‗African Miracle‘ similar to the ‗growth miracle‘ 
of Japan and South Korea (Easterly & Levin 1997; Temple 1999; Taylor 2003). It is 
argued that both democratic stability and economic growth are the result of a 
considerably less heterogeneous and more culturally tolerant political and social 
environment prevalent in the country (Hyden, Olowu & Ogendo 2000). This is 
consistent with Arend Lijphart‘s (cited in Mattes 1999) claim that social homogeneity, 
political consensus and a small population size are prerequisites for a conducive and 
stable democracy.  
 
Botswana is also said to have one of the highest rates of economic growth in Africa, 
which has surpassed all expectations for a Third World country. In 1966 (at the time 
of independence), Botswana‘s per capita GDP income was approximately US $ 80. 
By 1987, it had risen to US $ 1 050, higher than sub-Saharan Africa average of US $ 
330 (Republic of Botswana 1991). And by 1999 the per capita GDP income was more 
than US $ 6000 (Taylor 2003). It is widely claimed that this phenomenal growth and 
economic success is largely the result of the homogeneity of its population (Hartland-
Thunberg 1978; Picard 1987; Harvey & Lewis 1990; Easterly & Levine 1997; 
Samatar 1999; Temple 1999; Solway 2002; Taylor 2003; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 
2004). Werbner (2002: 680) aptly captures this in his remark that ―ethnic 
homogeneity is, admittedly, a part of Botswana‘s wider reputation for being an 
exceptional country in Africa.‖  
 
The central goal of this study is to test the adequacy of the two claims noted above, 
paying particular attention to the dynamics of homogeneity and common culture. 














 will entail the use of both objective and subjective indicators of ethnic 
identity. In Botswana, the more putatively objective indicators commonly used to 
measure ethnic identity are language and the number of tribes or ethnic groups. 
Admittedly, language has and continues to provide the basis for ethnic identity and 
self-perception, but determining the complete inventory of languages spoken in any 
country is difficult. This is due to both problems arising from generic linguistic 
classifications and failures to distinguish between languages and dialects. 
Furthermore, languages and language identities may constantly change due to shifts in 
societal attitudes, wholesale borrowing as one community comes into contact with 
another, or the incentives people have to speak a particular language and ties to social 
class and education (Constable & Simons 2000).  
 
The official designation of Setswana as the national language and the common use of 
“Batswana” (to refer to all citizens in the country irrespective of their ethnic group), 
is problematic because it obscures the existence of other languages. Such labelling 
characterizes the whole population as „Batswana‟ regardless of their ethnic origin and 
cultural descent (Andersson & Janson 1997). In fact, other equally important objective 
indicators of ethnicity such as the distribution of cultural traits, cultural boundary 
definitions, religion and race are rarely used as reference points by scholars of 
Botswana. Similarly, subjective indicators such as social identity, group 
consciousness and the existence of cultural associations are rarely invoked by scholars 
when analysing ethnic identity in Botswana. This study therefore seeks to highlight 
the complexities of the homogeneity thesis by posing the following research 
question(s): 
 
1. To what extent can Botswana be adequately characterized as ethnically 
homogeneous across three different dimensions (two objective and one 
subjective): a) language b) tribal affiliation and c) social identity? 
                                                 
4
 According to Young (2002), definitions and conceptualization of ethnicity vary considerably but 
converge around three core elements namely: (i) shared cultural properties such as language; a sense of 
shared historical experience; and shared cultural practices (ii) cultural consciousness, collective 
awareness and shared ancestry (iii) cultural boundaries. 
 Ethnicity is both a complex concept and a social construction. And it is important to make a clear 
distinction between ethnicity and other types of social identity such as religion, race, nationalism, 
gender and class. However, in this study ethnic identity and ethnicity are used interchangeably and 













2. To what extent do any observed differences in language, tribal affiliation or social 
identity correlate with the key political factors of national identity, interpersonal 
trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy? 
 
In sum, I put forward two main arguments in this study. First, the use of tribal 
affiliation (a putatively objective dimension) and social identity (a more subjective 
dimension) find a higher level of ethnic diversity in Botswana than is claimed by the 
proponents of the common wisdom. Second, differences in language, tribal affiliation 
and social identity rarely correlate with the key political factors of national identity, 
interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. Thus, 
Botswana is characterized by far higher levels of social identity than generally 
thought. Yet few of these lines of differences do not appear to be politicized. Perhaps 
it is this lack of politicization that is unique about Botswana and what explains its 
economic and political success, not its actual level of homogeneity or heterogeneity. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
Theoretically, this study calls for: (1) revising conventional understandings of the 
ethnic and cultural composition of Botswana and; (2) revising theoretical 
understandings of how social cleavages translate into political attitudes and 
behaviours, and thus shape democracy. It also seeks to inform policy debates and 
provide a basis for effective policy development. Several problems in Botswana‘s 
politics result from the emphasis on homogeneity. For example, linguistic minorities 
feel that some sections of the country‘s Constitution are discriminatory since the 
Constitution only lists Setswana speaking groups as the principal tribes in the country. 
For example, the old Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana provide 
for eight ex-officio members of the House of Chiefs from the Bakgatla, Bakwena, 
Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa tribes. 
Members from the non-Setswana speaking tribes are assigned a specially elected 
status and not even listed in the Constitution (Republic of Botswana 2000).
5
 Most 
international scholars writing on Botswana have largely ignored these issues. 
                                                 
5
 The recent (2005) amendments of Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana (in line 
with the recommendations of the Balopi Commission of Inquiry: 2000), have been criticized by 












Politically, policy-makers, planners and implementers need to articulate policies and 
social programmes that are informed by public opinion and grounded on empirical 
evidence. For example, the results of this study should help formulate a new national 
language policy that is reflective of the actual linguistic and cultural plurality of the 
country. Currently, the national language policy is a series of disjointed practices that 
place exclusive emphasis on Setswana. The findings should also help in the review of 
a nation-building strategy, and make it more inclusive and accommodative of the 
interests and wishes of minority groups, amidst growing murmurs of dissatisfaction 
from this section of Botswana‘s population. This is crucial if Botswana is to avoid the 




This study uses existing Afrobarometer survey data from Botswana drawn from 
Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) to answer the descriptive and explanatory 
research questions outlined in Section 1.2 above. The descriptive and explanatory 
hypotheses are tested at the micro-level analysis (e.g. Section 3.2, Chapter 3) through 
descriptive statistics such as percentages and cross tabulations and the use of 
inferential statistics such as Cramer‘s V, one-way ANOVA and Tukey‘s B test. The 
null hypotheses are either accepted or rejected using the typical level (p< 0.05) 
statistical significance (e.g. Section 3.5, Chapter 3). 
 
1.5 Outline of the Study 
 
Chapter 2 builds a theoretical foundation for the research by reviewing the relevant 
literature to identify and answer research issues. The chapter examines the common 
wisdom which sees Botswana as ethnically homogeneous and links this homogeneity 
to the country‘s democratic success (e.g. Easterly & Levine 1997; Temple 1999; 
Solway 2002; Norris & Mattes 2003).  
 
Several techniques developed in the past ten years to measure aspects and dimensions 
of ethnic identity are explored. These include the ethnic fractionalization measures 
used to account for economic growth in developing countries (e.g. Easterly & Levine 












by Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999); Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004); Mattes (2004) and 
Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt (2008) which not only provide a critique of the commonly 
used Ethno-Linguistic measures but also posit alternative and more progressive ethnic 
fractionalization measures.  
 
Finally, Chapter 2 advances the following descriptive and explanatory hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Linguistically, Botswana is less homogeneous than what the 
common wisdom suggests. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In terms of tribal affiliation, the level of heterogeneity in Botswana 
is higher than the common wisdom suggests. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Using a more subjective measure of social identity, Botswana will 
be more heterogeneous than common wisdom suggests. 
 
Hypothesis 4: I expect to find a weak relationship between language/tribal 
affiliation and national identity. 
 
Hypothesis 5: There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal 
affiliation and interpersonal trust. 
 
Hypothesis 6: There would be a strong relationship between language/tribal 
affiliation, political participation and voting. 
 
Hypothesis 7: There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal 
affiliation and government legitimacy. 
 
Hypothesis 8: There will be a weak relationship between the type of social 
identity and the level of national identity. 
 
Hypothesis 9: There will be a weak relationship between the type of social 
identity and interpersonal trust. 
 
Hypothesis 10: There will be a strong relationship between the type of social 
identity, political participation and voting. 
 
Hypothesis 11: There will be a strong relationship between the type of social 
identity and government legitimacy. 
 
To answer the research questions highlighted in section 1.2 above, in Chapter 3, I 
outline the methodology used in this study. This is done by providing the description 
and justification of the research design and methods used in this study. Focus is also 












between the independent and dependent variables. Finally, Chapter 3 focuses on the 
data analysis in particular, the selection, description and justification of the descriptive 
and inferential statistics used in this study. 
 
In Chapter 4, I examine and empirically test the extent to which Botswana can be 
adequately characterized as ethnically homogeneous using language (a more objective 
marker of ethnic identity) and tribal affiliation (a putatively objective marker of ethnic 
identity). I also examine the extent to which Botswana can be characterized as 
ethnically homogeneous when using social identity, a more subjective marker of 
ethnic identity. The chapter ends by summarizing the research results. These reveal 
that when using language ‗spoken most at home,‘ the common wisdom is confirmed. 
But when using ‗home language,‘ breakdown by district and rural-urban location, the 
level of heterogeneity is much higher hence the common wisdom needs revising. The 
results also reveal that minority languages are also concentrated in certain parts of the 
country. The use of tribe (a putatively objective) and social identity (a more objective) 
dimensions, the level of diversity is higher at the national, district level and in terms 
of rural-urban breakdown. In short, these results are not consistent with the common 
wisdom. 
 
Chapter 5 highlights the nature of the relationship between language and key political 
factors. This is done by juxtaposing and cross tabulating language and key political 
factors such as national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and 
government legitimacy. In short, it reveals that in Botswana, tribal diversity tribal 
differences exist and these do not appear to influence political attitudes and 
behaviours.  
. 
Chapter 6 looks at the nature of the relationship between tribal affiliation and key 
political factors. In short, it reveals mixed results. For example, some of the results 
reveal a strong and statistically significant relationship between tribal affiliation and 
national identity. Mixed and contradictory results are also observed with respect to the 
relationship between tribal affiliation, political participation and voting. For example, 
these results range from weak to moderately strong and statistically significant 
relationship. Finally, the relationship between tribal affiliation and interpersonal trust 













In Chapter 7, I explore the nature of the relationship between social identity and key 
political factors. It uses a more subjective marker of ethnic identity to uncover the 
levels of social identity cleavages in Botswana. The results reveal that important lines 
of divisions along social identity do exist. But these do not appear to influence and 
shape important political behaviours and attitudes in any significant way. 
 
In Chapter 8, I start by providing an overview of the analysis of the results reported in 
Chapters 4 through to 7. Several threads emerge from this chapter. Firstly when using 
language, (a more objective dimension of ethnic identity), Botswana appears to be 
ethnically homogeneous thus confirming the common wisdom. However, when using 
tribal affiliation (a putatively objective dimension) and social identity (a more 
subjective dimension), the level of ethnic heterogeneity is much higher than 
anticipated by the proponents of the common wisdom. Secondly, this study reveals 
the existence of differences along language, tribe and social identity dimensions. 
Perhaps, the most crucial aspect of the findings is that these lines of divisions do not 
seem to have any meaningful and political consequences on political behaviours and 
attitudes in Botswana. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by making reference to the implications of this study for 
theory and directions for future research. As I stated earlier, I put forward two main 
arguments in this study. First, the use of tribal affiliation (a putatively objective 
dimension) and social identity (a more subjective dimension) find a higher level of 
ethnic diversity in Botswana than is claimed by the proponents of the common 
wisdom. Second, differences in language, tribal affiliation and social identity rarely 
correlate with the key political factors of national identity, interpersonal trust, political 
participation, voting and government legitimacy. Thus, Botswana is characterized by 
far higher levels of social identity than generally thought. Yet few of these lines of 
differences do not appear to be politicized. Perhaps it is this lack of politicization that 
is unique about Botswana and what explains its economic and political success, not its 




















Whereas the previous chapter outlined the background to the research, identified the 
research problem, explored the justification for the research, and provided an 
introductory overview of methodology and the outline of the thesis. This chapter 
seeks to build a theoretical foundation of this research by reviewing the relevant 
literature and identifying pertinent research issues. The chapter is organised around 
four major topics: the common wisdom and state of our knowledge; the measurement 
of ethnic identity; conceptualization and measurement issues; the relationship between 
ethnic identity and electoral systems; and my hypotheses and models.  
 
2.2 The Common Wisdom and State of Knowledge  
 
There are two manifestations of the common wisdom on Botswana that are sometimes 
explicit, but more often implicit. That is, (1) sees Botswana as ethnically 
homogeneous and (2) this homogeneity connects to the country‘s economic and 
democratic success (Easterly & Levine 1997; Temple 1999; Solway 2002; Norris & 
Mattes 2003). In Botswana, ethnicity is largely conceptualized in ―objective‖ and 
―primordial‖ terms. That is, ethnic groups are seen as fixed, internally homogeneous 
and one-dimensional (Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; Mooko 2006)
6
. Such a 
simplistic approach equates ethnicity to tribe and language while ignoring other 
subjective dimensions such as social identity. Yet, more recent research traditions 
reveal that modern African ethnicity is a social construction, perpetually in creation 
(Vail 1989; Anderson 1991; Berman 1998; Mattes 1999; Young 2002; Berman, Eyoh 
& Kymlicka 2004). Other approaches to ethnicity such as ‗constructivism‘, 
‗instrumentalism‘ and ‗rational choice‘ have not been systematically applied to 
Botswana despite the fact that these approaches have persuasively shown that ethnic 
                                                 
6
 According to Mooko (2006:15) in his discussion of the threat of death of minority languages in 
Botswana, ―Language, by nature, is a mark of group identity.‖ This postulation underscores language 
as one out of the many markers of identity such as race, religion, gender and region. On the other hand, 
empirical evidence from past studies has revealed that language might not be the only or even the most 












groups are often fluid, internally fragmented and multidimensional (Berman 1998; 
Young 2002; Chandra 2005).  
 
Previous studies of ethnicity in Botswana consistently adopt a primordial perspective 
to understanding ethnic identity, tracing its historical evolution, ethnic composition, 
and the challenges and struggles of ethnic minorities to be accorded equal status 
conferred to Setswana speaking language and tribal groups by the national 
Constitution. Most studies also focus on the tensions and confrontations between 
ethnic majorities and minorities (Schapera 1952; Somolekae 1988; van Binsbergen 
1988-1992, 1994-2002; Holm & Molutsi 1989; Wylie 1991; van Waarden 1991; 
Mazonde 1998, 2002; Nyati-Ramahobo 1993, 2002; Solway 1994, 2002, 2004; 
Smieja 1999; Werbner 2002). In addition, the work by Batibo & Smieja (2000) is a 
descriptive attempt to not only provide facts about the state and future trends of 
minority languages, but also to link information and data about the languages of 
Botswana that are otherwise scattered in various academic writings. Empirical surveys 
also concentrate on language shift (i.e. abandoning one‘s language and adoption of a 
different language other than one‘s mother tongue) and death (i.e. extinction), as well 
as socio-linguistic issues regarding the minority languages of Botswana (Andersson & 
Janson 1997; Smieja 1999; Batibo & Tsonope 2000; Hasselbring 2000; Mazonde 
2002; Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006).  
 
While this literature is an invaluable part of the study of ethnic politics and ethnicity 
in Botswana, there are some caveats relating to their sources of data. Various scholars 
use different and contradictory figures that are not easy to reconcile. This is due to the 
lack of standardized and reliable data on the country‘s linguistic and tribal 
composition. According to Solway (2002), the 1946 population census conducted 
during the colonial period is the last census to record variables of ‗ethnic‘ identity 
such as tribe, sub-tribe or language. Thus Picard (1987), for example, estimates that 
approximately 80% of the population is Setswana speaking. Similarly, Nyati-
Ramahobo (1999) acknowledges the 80% figure, but asserts that Setswana as a 
national language is spoken by about 90% of the population either as a mother tongue 
or as a national language. She also suggests that minority languages make about 15% 












(1997) also acknowledge the 80% figure but estimate the proportion of Setswana 




As can be observed from the above arguments, descriptions and the operationalization 
of the common wisdom is riddled with uncertainties. This is largely due to the 
absence of definite figures with respect to the share of the population speaking the 
country‘s major language, Setswana. The proportion of the population believed to 
speak Setswana ranges from 70% to 90%. This lack of specificity makes it difficult to 
pin down a quantitative threshold that allows for unambiguous operationalization and 
definition of the common wisdom. In order to navigate around this problem, I start by 
conceptualizing and then move on to the operationalization of the term 
―homogeneous.‖ According to the Oxford Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary, a 
homogeneous group consists of ―people that all the same or all of the same type‖ 
(Hornby 2005: 717). 
 
Consistent with this definition, the literature on ethnicity (as I outline earlier), defines 
the term homogeneous as meaning single bounded, internal sameness and absence of 
politicization, division and fragmentation of a cultural ethnic group (Berman 1998; 
Stranfield 1993). Hartland-Thunberg‘s (1978: 3) conceptual definition implies a 
―tranquil, soft-spoken harmonious society.‖ In Botswana‘s context it means that 
―Batswana are in fact, eight main tribes, all of which speak the same language, 
Setswana.‖  
 
Having conceptualized homogeneous society, I now put the numbers to the 
operationalization of the common wisdom in Botswana. First, I explore several 
options including taking the lowest, average or highest figure as the threshold for a 
common understanding of the homogeneity thesis. In addition, I also carryout an 
exhaustive literature search for books, academic articles and newspaper articles that 
describe the ethnic composition of Botswana. After careful consideration, I fix the 
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quantitative threshold of the common wisdom at the upper limit of 90%. Such an 
approach allows this investigator to quantify and empirically test the hypotheses 
underlying the common wisdom. I consider the choice of 90% to be theoretically 
defensible but at the same time not ruling out important drawbacks associated with 
such a choice. Bratton & Mattes (2007) and Posner (2004b) provide detailed 
discussion on possible alternatives to explore when dealing with measurement and 
special problems. For example, conventionally, ‗don‘t knows‘ and ‗refused to answer‘ 
responses might be moved to the middle of the likert-type of ordinal scale during the 
recoding of data particularly when with attitudes and behaviours. Variables dealing 
with factual information like voting might be moved to the lower end of the likert-
type scale. In the next section, I move away from the debates on the common wisdom 
and focus attention on our state of knowledge. 
 
One recent study of the status of language use and knowledge in Botswana (Chebanne 
& Nyati-Ramahobo 2003), and another on the threat of minority language death 
(Mooko 2006) are worth reviewing for the purpose of this study. Chebanne & Nyati-
Ramahobo‘s study examines language use and language knowledge using Botswana‘s 
2001 Population and Housing Census. This finding reveals Setswana as the language 
reported to be most frequently used (78%) at home by the sampled respondents. 
However, although this is an important finding as it is not consistent with the common 
wisdom‘s claim, that Botswana is ethnically homogeneous, there are several caveats 
to be noted concerning Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo‘s understanding and 
conceptualization of ethnicity. Firstly, they display a weak conceptualization of 
ethnicity. The authors tend to ignore the broader interpretation of ethnicity which 
includes among other things social identity, gender, religion and tribal affiliation. 
Secondly, while Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) correctly make the claim that 
language rights are human rights they fail to address the debate on the political 
significance of language rights as human rights. 
 
Thirdly, Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo‘s (2003) criticism of the census 
questionnaire‘s use of the phrases „language spoken most at home‟, „home, and‟ „most 
often‟ lacks credibility. In fact, their criticism fails to take into account the theoretical 
debates surrounding the phrasing of language questions in censuses. Although the 












nevertheless widely accepted that the phrasing „language spoken most at home‟ is 
generally in order (see Kertzer & Dominique 2002:26-35). Fourthly, Chebanne & 
Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) take issue with the fact that the enumerators are instructed to 
code Setswana as 02 and English as 03 while ‗other language‘ is specified and written 
in the un-shaded area. This observation reveals the authors‘ misconception of the 
coding of nominal or categorical variables. The coding of nominal variables such as 
Setswana and English does not necessarily imply ranking or that one variable is more 
superior to the other.  
 
Finally, Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) take issue with the finding that 59% of 
the respondents report that Setswana is frequently used in the North-West district. 
These authors consider 59% to be too high a figure to represent the proportion of the 
respondents who report Setswana as their home language. They imply that this figure 
is unrealistically high given that the North West district is generally considered a 
‗melting pot‘ in the context of Botswana‘s ethnic composition. They further contend 
the number of respondents who report speaking Setswana is high due to the 
corresponding reduction in the number of non-Setswana in the district. For example, 
Herero (non-Setswana) communities were recently voluntarily repatriated to Namibia. 
The inferences and explanation offered by Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) are 
not supported by the available data and amount to ‗reading between the lines.‘ The 
number of the Herero who were repatriated to Namibia is too small and insignificant 
to effect any meaningful change on the overall pattern of the results of Chebanne & 
Nyati-Ramahobo‘s (2003) study. For example in 2002, a tripartite agreement, signed 
by the governments of Botswana and Namibia and the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees provide for the voluntary repatriation of about seven hundred people.  
(http://www.panapress.com/paysindexlat.asp?codepays=eng0368page=25) 
 
Mooko‘s (2006) study seeks to investigate and suggest measures to deal with the 
threat of minority language death in Botswana. This study is an invaluable 
contribution to the understanding of issues of ethnicity, and the status of minority 
languages in Botswana in particular. However, several limitations can be identified. 
First, the study is largely descriptive, lacking a strong empirical basis on which to 
situate the claim that minority languages are not only endangered but also face the 












language and tribal groups is well documented in Botswana. Notwithstanding, the 
author relies heavily on language figures based on estimates by Nyati-Ramahobo 
(2000), Andersson & Janson (1997); Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) all of 
which themselves lack a strong empirical foundation. In addition, there is no 
indication of how Mooko‘s (2006) claim of minority language death threat, is 
subjected to a rigorous empirical test. This is despite the availability of existing data 
sets such as Afrobarometer survey data covering the period of 1999 to the present.  
 
Finally, Mooko‘s (2006:115) claim that ―language, by its nature, is a mark of group 
identity‖ is problematic. This claim ignores the existence of other markers of group 
identity such as tribal affiliation and gender. Similarly, the claim ignores more 
subjective dimensions of ethnicity such as social identity and religion. Thus the study 
adopts a primordialist approach to the understanding of cultural identity hence its 
emphasis on the preservation of threatened languages and cultures. There is no 
indication that Mooko‘s study considers the possibility of the re-construction of 
threatened languages, an alternative option consistent with constructivist and 
instrumentalist approaches to the study of languages and culture. These approaches 
recognize that ―ethnic groups are... social constructions with histories of expansion 
and contraction, amalgamation and division‖ (Posner 2004b). This means that ethnic 
groups can grow and shrink, emerge and disappear. The underlying argument is not to 
dispute the importance of language per se; but to underscore the temptation of 
examining language in isolation of other dimensions of ethnic identity. 
 
In summary, the shortcomings arising from Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo‘s (2003) 
and Mooko‘s (2006) studies call for further empirical study to interrogate the 
relationship between language and ethnic identity in Botswana. Such a study needs to 
go beyond the use of census data since these are not always reliable sources of data 
because of their inherent weaknesses. In censuses, there is the tendency to assign 
people to a single category thus implying the sharing of a common identity. Kertzer & 
Dominique (2002: 10) remind us of the possibility that ―identities being by definition 
subjectively determined, their conceptual representation in any census can only reflect 
subjective process.‖ The existence of Afrobarometer survey data collected since 1999 













Furthermore, there exists extensive body of literature by Botswana and African 
scholarship which adequately explore themes and issues of ethnicity. More 
specifically such scholarship examines issues such as the: exclusion of minority 
languages from the mainstream domains of everyday life in post colonial Africa; 
nation-building projects based on hegemonic and assimilationist policies and; 




2.3 Conceptualization and Measurement Issues 
 
Over the past ten years, several new techniques have been developed to measure 
aspects and dimensions of ethnic identity. Early research on economic growth and 
ethnic diversity employed indices of ethnic fractionalization (Easterly & Levine 1997; 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 2003). In contrast, Bannon, 
Miguel & Posner (2004:11) have criticized the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 
(ELF), arguing that the: 
 
 ...assumption underlying this approach has it exactly backwards. It turns out 
that the more diverse a country is, the less salient ethnicity is for its citizens...At 
very low levels of diversity, ethnicity will also be salient for the simple reason 
that everyone is a member of the same group. But as ethnic diversity increases 
from very lower levels to the middle of the range, ethnicity will become more 
and more salient, as minority groups begin to challenge the dominant group for 
power. 
 
In the light of the above argument, Bannon, Miguel & Posner‘s (2004) study is crucial 
as it is one of the few studies to employ a „superior‟, direct measurement of the 
salience of ethnicity. In contrast to past measurement studies, their study utilizes 
comparative techniques in examining survey data from more than 14 000 respondents 
in nine African countries (Botswana included). However, Bannon, Miguel & Posner‘s 
(2004) study presents two shortcomings. Firstly, it contains inaccurate information 
with respect to the operationalization and categorization of „sub-tribes‟ in Botswana. 
For example, these researchers suggest that ―in Botswana, where approximately 80 
percent of the country‘s population is Setswana, ethnic responses are in terms of sub-
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tribes i.e. Mongwato, Mokweme [sic], Mokgatla, and so forth‖ (Bannon, Miguel & 
Posner 2004:4). The categorization of Mongwato, Mokwena or Mokgatla as „sub-
tribes‟ is inaccurate and out of context. Historically, the examples cited above are 
tribes in their own right and not „sub-tribes‟. These are the tribes that the common 
wisdom regards as the ‗major‘ or principal tribes. In Botswana „sub-tribes‟ often refer 
to subordinate tribal/language groups (i.e. ethnic minorities like Bakalanga and 
Wayeyi) and has derogatory connotations (Schapera 1952; Morton, Murray & Ramsay 
1989; Andersson & Janson 1997; Bennett 2006). In fact, none of the minority tribes 
are given as examples in the list of „sub-tribes‟ provided by these researchers. 
Incidentally, Posner (2004b:851) in a separate study highlights the ―grouping‖ 
problem where clearly distinct ethnographic and political groups are collapsed into a 
single category leading to the result that ―an important cleavage is hidden from the 
view.‖ Ironically, Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004) appear to have fallen in the same 
trap observed by Posner (2004b). 
 
Secondly, while the use and value of comparative studies cannot be overemphasized, 
it is equally important to examine the political salience of ethnicity at the micro-level. 
Such an approach will help in filling in the gap that is otherwise overlooked by 
comparative studies. This is the void that this particular study seeks to fill. I cross 
tabulate data on language, tribal affiliation and social identity (independent variables) 
with other micro level variables that measure national identity, interpersonal trust, 
political participation and government legitimacy.  
 
Additionally, Posner (2004b) developed a new fractionalization index for Africa 
called the Politically Relevant Ethnic Group (PREG) measure. This new 
fractionalization measure is intended to augment the shortfalls associated with the 
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) developed by Easterly & Levine (1997). 
Posner (2004b) maintains that ELF measures are largely inappropriate because they 
do not reflect the political groups ―that are actually doing the competition over policy‖ 
but rather tend to reflect the political groups that the ethnographer identifies as distinct 
cultural groups (Posner 2004b:853). For example, ELF measures suggest a strong link 
between ethnic heterogeneity and diversity in Africa, as explaining slow economic 
growth performance or ―growth tragedy.‖ In contrast, PREG is based on counting 












accounting for the policy-mediated effects of ethnic diversity on economic growth 
than ELF measures. 
 
Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt‘s (2008) critique of the existing ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization indices used in most growth studies is illuminating. In short, they 
observe that studies that rely on ethno-linguistic measures such as those of Easterly & 
Levine (1997) often assume primordial explanations, that is, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is conceived as constant over time. Such an analysis, does not take 
into account the fact that fractionalization changes with corresponding changes in 
economic growth and performance. Similarly, such growth studies do not investigate 
why change occurs where it does. Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt (2008) highlight the 
critical nature of issues of measurement, accuracy, appropriate construction and 
interpretation of fractionalization indices. They suggest the ―need to move beyond the 
consideration of static measures with wide geographical sweep‖ (Fedderke, Luiz & de 
Kadt 2008: 294). Furthermore, the way forward lies in the possibility that the use of 
―time series data for individual country case studies may be a fruitful new route for 
social scientists interested in the development prospects of developing countries‖ 
(Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt:302). This approach can be facilitated through the use of 
societal and political indicators such as linguistic, religious, and racial 
fractionalization measures. 
 
2.4 Ethnic Identity and Electoral Systems 
 
Studies by Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999), Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004), and Mattes 
(2004) call for the revision of the common wisdom. The first two studies in particular, 
examine and use new sets of data, different indicators and fractionalization indices to 
measure social identity in Botswana. The Mattes study on the other hand provides a 
theoretical framework for understanding the linkage between social identity and 
national identity in African politics. 
 
Scarritt & Mozaffar‘s (1999) study is illuminating as it highlights the link between 
ethnicity and electoral systems. They present a comprehensive data set on ethno-
political groups in fourteen African countries, including Botswana. Their study 












Black Africa Handbook (BAH) data sets, to create their own coding of ethnopolitical 
groups
9
. They recognize that individuals possess multiple group membership and that 
similarly, countries contain multiple dimensions of ethnic cleavages. This realization 
led Scarritt & Mozaffar to develop multiple measures of ethnic diversity for each 
country. Their data set provides up to three different enumerations of ethnic systems, 
namely: countries that constitute a ―national dichotomy;‖ those at the ―middle level of 
aggregation‖ and those at the ―lower level of aggregation‖ (Posner 2004b:852). Their 
measurement takes into account and incorporate potentially relevant spatial 
information about the spatial distribution of groups across the country (Mozaffar, 
Scarritt & Galaich (2003). This provides an alternative measurement to Easterly & 
Levine‘s Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index.
10
 In clear contrast to the common 
wisdom they find the existence of ethnopolitical cleavages at the middle level of 
aggregation in Botswana.  
 
Notwithstanding its contribution, Scarritt & Mozaffar‘s study make an oversight in 
the categorization and classification of Botswana‘s ethnopolitical groups. For 
example, the Ngwato are inaccurately coded as representing the majority in what the 
researchers call ―Bamangwato reserve,‖ instead of the current and correct 
geographical description of ―Central District.‖ And to use the label ―Bamangwato 
reserve,‖ (a colonial title) in 1999 is an oversight not consistent with the current 
academic discourse on issues of ethnic identities in Botswana. Besides, it is generally 
believed that the Ngwato only constitutes a small fraction of the ethnic groups found 
in the district (Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Parsons 1999; Solway 2002; 2004; 
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Similarly, it is inaccurate to suggest that the Kalanga are only concentrated in the 
north-eastern part of the country. In fact the Kalanga are also found in much of the 
Central District. Basarwa (Bushmen) are also inaccurately coded as concentrated in 
one region whereas they live in almost all parts of the country (Morton, Murray & 
Ramsay 1989; Parsons 1999; Solway 2002; 2004; Selolwane 2004; Bennett 2006; 
Mooko 2006). Other minority language groups whose status and size can be equated 
to the Yei, Kgalagadi and San such as Subiya, Tswapong, Birwa and so forth are 
omitted without any justification. Furthermore, the Balete are coded twice as ‗Melete‘ 




In spite of the shortcomings cited above, the country coding generated by Scarritt & 
Mozaffar provides an indispensable data set for measuring ethnicity. It highlights the 
fact that ethnopolitical cleavages and divisions are more complex than suggested by 
common wisdom. Yet it is evident that large, cross-national data sets such as the ones 
used to construct BAH and MAH are unable to capture the intricacies that ethnicity 
analysis requires at the micro-level. This therefore calls for a separate study that 
focuses on a micro-level analysis of ethnic identity in Botswana. 
 
Perhaps, the most significant challenge to the common wisdom comes from the 
Afrobarometer survey data on social identity as utilized by Bannon, Miguel & Posner 
(2004). Their study is one the first (together with that of Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-
Boadi 2005) to use Afrobarometer survey data to examine ethnic identity in nine 
African countries including Botswana. This study adopts a comparative approach to 
illuminate social identity to dispel myths about the salience, origins and subjective 
nature of self and ethnic identifications in Africa. Their findings reveal that Africans 
generally identify themselves ―first and foremost‖ in ethnic terms. Bannon, Miguel & 
Posner‘s (2004) study is also significant in this regard as it suggests that social 
identities in Botswana are reasonably diverse.  
 
The study by Mattes (2004) poses and answers the question of why social identity is 
politically important and salient in African politics despite the global effects of 
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modernization and globalization. This study focuses on South Africa to find out the 
actual state of social identity; whether there are any tangible shifts in identity and; the 
extent to which identity is necessarily dominated by racial and ethnic loyalties or 
other forms of identification. It is nevertheless relevant to a study of Botswana. The 
empirical evidence from Mattes reveals that while racial and ethnic loyalties are still 
an important source of identity, South Africans simultaneously exhibit extremely high 
levels of national identity. These findings undoubtedly provide some basis for 
understanding the association between social identity and national identity in 
Botswana‘s politics. It suggests the possibility that people in Botswana, may identify 
themselves in tribal and linguistic terms, while at the same time maintaining 
allegiance to the nation state.  
 
In brief, what is important at this juncture is to take the cue from these studies and 
examine the extent to which Botswana can be characterized as ethnically homogenous 
using social identity as a subjective measurement. Furthermore, no one has yet 
examined how language, tribal affiliation or social identities correspond to political 
attitudes and behaviours.. 
 
2.5 Hypotheses and Models 
 
The next two sections examine my descriptive and explanatory hypotheses together 
with their corresponding logic, models and theories. 
 
2.5.1 Descriptive Hypotheses 
 
This section unpacks the following descriptive research question: To what extent can 
Botswana be adequately characterized as ethnically homogeneous across three 
different dimensions: a) language b) tribal affiliation and c) social identity? In order to 
do that the following descriptive hypotheses are examined:  
 
2.5.1.1 Language: A More Objective Dimension of Ethnic Identity  
 














Once we use appropriate data I expect to find a greater diversity in the use of 
languages in Botswana than what the common wisdom suggests. Currently in 
Botswana, there is a growing scholarly debate about multiculturalism. The debate 
revolves around issues of the Balopi Commission of Inquiry and constitutional 
amendments to sections 77, 78 and 79 that are perceived to be discriminatory by 
ethnic minorities. Sections 77, 78 and 79 of Botswana‘s Constitution are perceived to 
be discriminatory and promoting inequalities by members of minority language 
groups and tribes (van Binsbergen 1994-2002; Republic of Botswana 2000; Batibo & 
Smieja 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002). The 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry (dubbed Balopi Commission i.e. named after its 
convener, Patrick Balopi, formerly a cabinet minister and the Speaker of the National 
Assembly) was instituted in mid-2000 with the view of making the said sections of 
the constitution ‗tribally neutral‘ (Republic of Botswana 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 
2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002). The commission was set up at a time when 
there was widespread discontent and powerful debate on minorities (Mazonde 2002). 
 
In the follow-up to the Balopi Commission of Inquiry, battle lines were drawn in the 
ensuing debates between rival cultural groups claiming to protect their specific 
interests (Republic of Botswana 2000; 2000a); Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 
2004; Werbner 2002). On the one hand was Pitso Ya Batswana (literally translated to 
mean ‗the call of Batswana‘) whose membership comprise mainly majority language 
groups and tribes who feel that Sections 77 to 79 of Botswana‘s Constitution is not 
discriminatory. Minority language groups and tribes, on the opposite side feel that 
these sections are discriminatory. These include among others: the Society for the 
Promotion of Ikalanga Language (SPIL, formed in 1981) and Kamanakao 
Association i.e. meaning ‗their remnants‘ or Revival and formed in 1995 by the 
Wayeyi speakers to revitalize and preserve the Yei culture (van Binsbergen 1994-
2002; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Trewby & Fitchat 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; 
Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002; Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006
13
). According to 
Solway (2002:723), ―with few exceptions, the founders and leaders of these 
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organizations are young people, educated, urban-based and hold valued formal sector 
employment. Several are associated with the University of Botswana.‖ 
 
As a result of the Balopi Commission and subsequent debates surrounding the 
constitutional amendments of the said sections, I expect to find greater awareness by 
ethnic minorities concerning the need to promote, preserve and conserve their 
language and tribal identities. More than ever before, ethnic minorities are 
increasingly organizing themselves through the formation of cultural organizations 
such as the First People of the Kalahari, RETENG (national umbrella body formed to 
coordinate the activities of ethnic minority groups and associations in the country), 
and Society for the Promotion of Ikalanga Language (SPIL) and Kamanakao 
Association (cultural groups of the people belonging to the Wayeyi and Bakalanga 
respectively). Furthermore, these cultural organizations also stage annual cultural 
festivals whose main purpose is also to promote their indigenous languages, tribal and 
cultural identities. In fact, while these groups claim to be concerned with cultural 
matters and issues, there is no doubt that some of their activities have in actual fact 
intended and unintended political consequences (van Binsbergen 1994-2002; Nyati-
Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002; Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006). 
 
My prediction above is somewhat consistent with past studies that reveal that 
language is one of the crucial markers of social identification and categorization. In 
other words, it is not only a symbol of but also an important and salient dimension of 
ethnic identity, thus valued by its users and speakers. (Abrams & Hogg 1990). Several 
competing explanations are worth highlighting. One competing explanation is that in 
some instance, language groups may be reluctant to publicly identify with their 
indigenous language for fear of stigmatization. Instead they may prefer to identify 
with the majority language group (Dorian 1999; Fishman 1991, 1999). Alternatively, 
people may also be reluctant to identify themselves in terms of their indigenous 
language because of the fact that most languages of the world today, are in danger of 
extinction, since schools, government administration and business are conducted in a 
majority language despite the multilingual nature of most societies (Dorian 1999; 














5.2.1.2 Tribal affiliation: A Putatively Objective Dimension of Ethnic Identity 
 
Hypothesis 2: In terms of tribal affiliation, the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is 
higher than what common wisdom suggests. 
 
The common wisdom is based on the notion of Botswana as consisting of eight major 
Tswana tribes leaving out non-Tswana speaking tribes (Hartland-Thunberg 1978). In 
contrast, I expect to find a relatively high level of heterogeneity, that is, affiliation to 
many more tribes than suggested by the common wisdom. The expectation is that the 
common wisdom is inadequate since it is primarily occupied with only one of the 
many markers of ethnic identity, namely, language. Yet when one examines the 
language-tribe nexus in the Botswana context, it is intricate and mutually inclusive. In 
other words, there is no way in which one can talk about language without necessarily 
implying the tribal dimension or vice versa. For example, Tribal names are preceded 
with the prefix Mo- (for example Mongwato used to refer to a person who speaks 
Sengwato that is a dialect of Setswana language) while language names are preceded 
by the prefix Se- (for example Sekalaka language is used to refer to a person whose 
tribal affiliation is Kalanga that is, Mokalaka). My logic is also partially premised on 
the assumption that in Africa: 
Parochial ethnic loyalties were merely cultural ghosts lingering on into the 
present...destined to disappear in the face of the social, economic and political 
changes that were everywhere at work...‗modernization‘ would do the 
job...ethnic loyalties would fade away...Ethnicity, however, failed to cooperate 
with its many would-be pall-bearers (Vail 1989: 1-2). 
 
In other words, self-identification, deep-seated allegiance and attachment with tribal 
affiliation remain one of the most salient markers of ethnic identity (Galkina 2004). 
 
2.5.1.3 Social Identity: A More Subjective Dimension of Ethnic Identity 
 
Hypothesis 3: Using a subjective measure of social identity, Botswana is more 
heterogeneous than the common wisdom suggests. 
 
I expect to find a multiplicity of social identities co-existing amongst and across the 
various social identity groups. In contrast to my prediction, the common wisdom 












traditional marker of ethnic identity. It seldom uses more subjective dimensions such 
as religion, gender and occupation. More specifically, I expect to find that many 
people in Botswana identify themselves using other ethnic labels (besides language) 
such as tribe, sub-tribe, clan, and social categories related to kinship such as region, 
class or gender. My prediction is that once we use more subjective markers, Botswana 
is relatively more heterogeneous than the common wisdom wants us to believe. I 
predict this hypothesis to be supported because people‘s social identities, perceptions 
of themselves and who they are continually shaped by forces of modernization. In 
particular, as a result of the increase in the pace of industrialization and literacy rates, 
people are more likely to be cognitively aware of their self-identifications and use 
these as primary forms of social identity. 
 
My logic is also consistent with past studies that reveal that generally individuals 
possess multiple group memberships and similarly, countries also contain multiple 
dimensions of cleavages such as ethnicity, religion, language, gender and region. In 
fact, these dimensions reflect on the one hand, the willingness of individuals to claim 
multiple affiliations, on the other hand, the country‘s diversity on a particular 
dimension in question (Mattes 1999; Mozaffar, Scarritt & Galaich 2003; Bannon, 
Miguel & Posner 2004; Posner 2004a, 2004b). Past studies also widely assume that 
plural societies are generally characterized by a multiplicity of social identities 
(Mattes 1999). 
 
Finally, the above descriptive arguments only go as far as demonstrating the existence 
of diverse languages, tribes and social identities in Botswana. If ethnic homogeneity 
leads to political stability, the question that remains to be answered is what do the 
findings of diversity mean politically? In fact, I expect to find that the key indicators 
of support for Botswana‘s democracy (such as national identity, interpersonal trust, 
legitimacy, political participation and voting) are structured along the newly 
discovered identity cleavages. The next section focuses on the explanatory research 

















2.5.2 Explanatory Hypotheses 
 
This section extends and integrates prior research in the exploration of the following 
descriptive research question: To what extent do differences in language or social 
identity correlate with national identity, interpersonal trust, legitimacy, political 
participation and voting? In order to do that, the following explanatory hypotheses are 
explored in detail:  
 
2.5.2.1 Relationship between Language, Tribal Affiliation
14
 and National Identity 
 
Hypothesis 4: I expect to find no relationship between both language and tribal 
affiliation on the one hand and national identity on the other. More specifically, I 
expect to find that people who belong to linguistic/tribal minority groups are equally 
patriotic as those who belong to majority language/tribal groups. 
 
The common wisdom depicts Batswana as one happy, homogeneous and loyal people. 
I expect that people who belong to linguistic/tribal minorities will display equal levels 
of patriotism as other citizens. I expect this prediction to be true given the absence of 
secessionist sentiments on the part of ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities (with the 
notable exception of Basarwa) are not necessarily economically marginalized 
particularly in terms of resource and land distribution and allocation. Although ethnic 
minorities are dissatisfied with perceived discrimination embedded in some pieces of 
legislation such as the Tribal Territories Act and the corresponding naming of some of 
the District Council (e.g. Kweneng District Council and Kgatleng District Council 
named after Bakwena and Bakgatla respectively that is, two of the Tswana principal 
tribes) and Lands Boards (e.g. Ngwato Land Board and Tawana Land Board named 
after the Bangwato and Batawana respectively that two of the Tswana principal tribes) 
after some of the major Tswana tribes, the reality on the ground is that resource and 
land allocation is done more equitably. That is every citizen of Botswana stand equal 
chance to be allocated land anywhere in the country without any regard to ethnicity. 
In fact, the distribution of social services is informed by the national principles of 
Economic Development, Unity, Self-reliance and ―Botho‖ (i.e. respect for one‘s self 
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and other people). This perhaps partly explains why Botswana appears to be an 
―exceptional‖ nation state in Africa. 
 
The above prediction is consistent with the theoretical claim by Solway (2002, 2004) 
who contends that in Botswana, minority language and tribal groups do not challenge 
national citizenship but seek to embrace it in addition to maintaining ethnic-based 
loyalties and attachments. According to Solway (2004:138), ethnic minorities ―... 
desire to claim their particularistic identities not instead of, but in addition to, 
Botswana citizenship....‖  
 
In fact, prior studies also reveal that it is possible for feelings of national identity, 
fragmentation, tensions and divisive tendencies within the nation state to coexist side 
by side with the local identities such as ethnic or tribal group affiliation (Tajfel 1984; 
Vail 1989; Glickman 1995; Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999; Solway 2002, 2004; Young 
2002: Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004). According to Pye & Verba (1965:534), it is 
logical that ―individuals develop a multiple set of loyalties when loyalties on various 
levels are believed not to be in conflict.‖ They further posit that, the existence of 
multiple loyalties is promoted where democratic governance, provides an 
environment conducive for the creation of a stable political culture. In other words, 
the existence of multiple loyalties does not always and necessarily lead to ethnic 
fractionalization. 
 
Previous studies also offer alternative explanations to the relationship between 
language/tribal affiliation and national identity in Africa. Ethnic identities are 
extremely fluid, that is, the boundaries and contents of ethnicity changes from time to 
time since they are not wholly primordial identities (Glickman 1995:8). More 
specifically, language is perceived to be a fluctuating marker of ethnic identity and at 
the same time provides a privileged means of social, economic and political mobility 
(Kertzer & Dominique 2002). To this extent, the study by Oakes (2001) also makes 
the same observation by stating that the relationship between language and national 
identity is neither static, nor predictable but rather varies over time even within the 













The second alternative explanation is that the primordial approach can help us explain 
why members of minority tribes appear to simultaneously maintain strong emotions 
and attachments to both their ethnic groups and the nation state. According to this 
approach, the construction of national identities is often associated with ethnic and 
national attachments (Tajfel 1984; Jones 1997; Young 2002). Glickman (1995) also 
highlights the importance of primordialism in shaping ethnic identity, tribal affiliation 
and construction of ethnic sentiments. In other words, national identity is thus 
intricately linked to ethnic identity, a more powerful force that does not easily 
disappear as predicted by critics of the primordial approach. In fact, Glickman‘s 
theoretical proposition is consistent with Bannon, Miguel & Posner‘s (2004) empirical 
finding of the multidimensionality of ethnicity and the possibility that individuals may 
possess multiple identities at any one time. Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999) also observes 
the existence of multiple levels of ethnic cleavages among multiplicity of groups in 
virtually every African country. 
 
The third alternative explanation is the role of language as an instrument of 
communication and a symbolic marker of ethnic identity (Oakes 2001). There are 
many factors that can be used to explain the role language plays in the construction of 
national identity. Such factors include economic considerations, level of education 
and urbanization (Glickman 1995; Oakes 2001; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; 
Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). 
 
5.2.2.2 Relationship between Language, Tribal Affiliation and Interpersonal Trust 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a strong relationship between language and tribal affiliation, 
and interpersonal trust. More specifically I expect to find that people who belong to 
minority language/tribal groups will be more likely to have higher levels of 
interpersonal trust compared to their majority counterparts. 
 
I expect that people who belong to minority language/tribal groups will have higher 
levels of interpersonal trust because ethnically they are used to having to assimilate 
and integrate into the dominant culture. In contrast, people who belong to the majority 
language/Tswana groups are less likely to trust out-groups since their ethnic 












not have the incentive to assimilate into the culture of the ethnic ‗other.‘ Furthermore, 
the expectation is that members of minority language groups and tribes will be too 
trusting owing to their historical experience and the fact that in the past they had and 
continue to assimilate and integrate into the dominant Tswana culture (Morton, 
Murray & Ramsay 1989; Wylie 1991; Molutsi 1998; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Nyati-
Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Selolwane 2004). I predict that past historical 
experiences naturally make the minority language groups and tribes more enduring, 
more tolerant and forgiving. In contrast, members of majority language groups and 
tribes are expected to be less trusting due to the fact that their ethnic personality is 
mirrored and reflected in the country‘s name, Botswana (Andersson & Janson 1997; 
Batibo & Smieja 2000), thus they have no incentive to assimilate into the culture of 
minority language groups and tribes. Besides, they do not have painful memories 
from the past that are more likely to make them more tolerate of people who are 
seemingly different to them. Their primary concern is to maintain the status quo and 
the dominant social status. 
 
In Botswana the following example serves to partially explain why ethnic majority are 
less likely to trust than their minority counterparts. It is common practice for members 
of ethnic majority to use phrases like Moratshwana/Meratshwana (sub-tribe/sub-
tribes or inferior tribes) and prefix Le- and Ma- to refer to members of minority 
language groups and tribes. Conversely, the phrases Morafe/Merafe (tribe/tribes) and 
the prefix Mo- (singular) and Ba- (plural) were used in reference to majority language 
groups and tribes (Moilwa 1975; Werbner 2002).
15
 The use such forms of 
identification and description amount to what Sachdev and Bourhis (1990) though not 
specifically referring to Botswana‘s context call devalorization and stigmatization of 
minority languages and tribes.  
 
The persistence of the above perceptions of ethnic minorities by their majority 
counterparts stems from the past historical events and experiences relating to 
Botswana‘s ethnic politics. These generally point to the subordination and subjugation 
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of minority language groups and tribes by their majority counterparts and this is well 
documented (Andersson & Janson 1997; van Binsbergen 1994-2002; Batibo & Smieja 
2000; Trewby & Fitchat 2000; Solway 2002, 2004; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Werbner 
2002; Bennett 2006). In line with this logic Pye & Verba (1965:8) also remind us that 
political culture is rooted in public events and experiences and that non-political belief 
– such as feelings of basic distrust and suspicion, can have overriding implications for 
human relations thus giving credence to the role of past historical events in shaping 
political attitudes and behaviours.  
 
2.5.2.3 Relationship between Language/Tribal Affiliation and Political Participation 
 
Hypothesis 6: There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation, 
political participation and voting. More specifically, members of minority 
language/tribal groups are more likely to engage in civic and voluntary organizations 
than their majority counterparts. In terms of voting, more specifically minority 
language speakers/tribes are less likely to vote than their majority language 
counterparts. 
 
I expect members of minority language/tribal groups to play an active part in civic 
and voluntary associations, as a way of circumventing their perceived marginalized 
status in a society, whose political institutions are dominated and permeated by 
Tswana cultures, attitudes and behaviours (Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002; 
Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006). I expect increased civic participation by ethnic 
minorities to be a deliberate strategy that allows them not only to socially integrate 
but at the same time influence importance decision-making processes from within the 
polity. Thus, by actively participating in civic and voluntary associations, members of 
minority language and tribal groups would invariably be adopting positive strategies, 
meant to re-define their status in comparison to the out-groups (Abrams & Hogg 
1990). Thus, by actively participating in civic and voluntary associations, members of 
minority language and tribal groups would invariably be adopting positive strategies, 
meant to re-define their status in comparison to the out-groups (Abrams & Hogg 
1990). The achievement of this goal will be much easier if members of ethnic 
minority groups are equally active as members of majorities. Below, I demonstrate the 












participation by ethnic minorities. The benefits of civic political participation in 
Botswana, is aptly captured by Nyati-Ramahobo (coordinator of the Kamanakao 
Association), when she explains her role in: 
... In the Association‘s campaign... As coordinator... I myself influenced certain 
reactions from government. At first, because I am a woman, they acted as if the 
association was weak, in ways women are supposed to be, and as if government 
could quietly undermine its activities until it died a natural death. Breaking the 
silence, the government began to pay serious attention when the matter was 
already in court... The perceived weakness turned out to be an actual strength, 
because being ignored and dismissed as a ‗dreamer‘ meant that I, and in turn the 
association, had space to forge ahead with our activities at our own pace. 
Moreover, being a Dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of 
Botswana meant that I... had resources to communicate with the membership 
(Nyati-Ramahobo 2002:690). 
In fact, Kamanakao Association is not the only civil society organization that took the 
Botswana Government to court. The First People of the Kalahari (of course with the 
moral and financial support of Survival International) also took Government to court, 
in what is acclaimed as a landmark court case in the legal history of Botswana. The 
First People of the Kalahari took the Government to court to protest what they 
perceived as forced removal of Basarwa communities from the Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve (CKGR). Although the Government denied using force, preferring to 
use the term, re-location, the High Court judgement and ruling on the case at the close 
of 2006, up-held the perception of forced removal of the Basarwa from their ancestral 
lands, and ordered that they be allowed to return to the CKGR. 
 
Turning to voting, firstly, I expect to find a strong relationship between 
language/tribal affiliation and voting, because, the minority vote cannot change the 
status quo as long as the electoral process is premised on the principle of the ‗winner 
takes all‘ or ‗first past the post‘. In other words, it does not make any difference 
whether or not the minority language speakers/tribes vote. I expect voting to have 
different incentives for minority groups than civic participation because it is a multi-
staged process that involves a series of steps. For example, for one to vote, one first 
needs to be motivated. Secondly, one has to take the decision to vote. Thirdly, the 
decision to vote has to be followed by going through the registration processes. In the 
context of Botswana, the registration process has its own challenges. For example, 












members of minority language groups and tribes, has to be understood in the light of 
voter registration, education and information dissemination procedures. The official 
media such as The Daily News, the two radio stations and Botswana Television, tend 
to overlook minority language groups and tribes, most of which are non-Setswana 
linguistic groups and tribes. Fourth, voting procedures among other things entail 
possession of a valid registration card, a valid national identity card (dubbed Omang 
i.e. ‗who are you‘?), and potential voters have to walk or travel to register at a 
designated polling station or the nearest Registration Offices, or District 
Administration Offices where they are available. Other forms of identification 
documents like driver‘s licences and passports are not accepted, despite the fact that 
possession of a valid Omang is a prerequisite for obtaining these documents. Besides, 
the issuing of Omang and passports is the responsibility of the same line ministry. 
 
Finally, once the registration hurdle is overcome, the focus is then on turning out to 
vote on an election day. The Election Day is usually set several years and months 
after the registration. For ethnic minorities the intervening period and the Election 
Day poses yet another set of challenges in particular the official language policy 
where Setswana and English are designated as the national and official languages 
respectively. Given this policy, I generally expect minority groups to feel that their 
languages are not officially accommodated in the public sphere thus marginalized. My 
prediction is that because of this discontent, ethnic minorities are more likely to 
abstain from voting and or alternatively vote for the opposition parties as way of 
demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the prevailing political processes. This 
prediction is consistent with the study by Selolwane (2004) that, in Botswana, some 
people were cynical about voting especially when they fail to see the beneficial 
consequences that are likely to flow out of the entire electoral process.  
 
The above viewpoint is consistent with the theoretical proposition, that, political 
institutions and institutional variables such as electoral formula matter significantly 
(Mozaffar 1995; The Independent Electoral Commission 2002; Kuenzi & Lambright 
2007). For example, the study by Dalton & Wattenberg (1993), reveal that voter 
registration systems and electoral procedures, do impact on voter turnout and more 
specifically on the decision to or not to vote. In addition, Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-












from participating in the electoral processes, due to problems of complying with 
cumbersome registration procedures.  
 
In sum, my prediction is consistent with theoretical position adopted by scholars of 
political participation, that it is both a multidimensional and multifarious process (Nie 
& Verba 1975; Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). 
Political participation is invariably affected by a number of interlocking and complex 
factors, hence, seemingly difficult to accurately predict and predetermine. In 
connection with the complex nature of political participation, Nie & Verba (1975:7) 
remind us that, ―... the citizenry is not divided simply into gladiators and non-
gladiators. Rather, there are many types of gladiators in different acts with different 
motives and different consequences.‖ Thus competing models and theories have been 
formulated to account for factors that can persuasively be used to explain political 
participation both as an independent and a dependent variable (Nie & Pye 1975). 
Besides, political participation can have a wide range of meanings. For example, it 
can be used to refer to political orientations (such as attitudes and beliefs) or political 
activities (Nie & Pye 1975; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). 
 
2.5.2.4 Relationship between Language/Tribal Affiliation and Government 
Legitimacy 
 
Hypothesis 7:  There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation 
and government legitimacy. More specifically, minority language/tribal groups will be 
less likely to see the political regime as legitimate as majority language/tribal groups. 
 
I expect the above hypothesis to be true, because in the past, members of minority 
language/tribal groups have been badly treated as subordinates by the Tswana 
language and tribal groups (Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Werbner 2002). Furthermore, 
members of minority language and tribal groups are also referred to as- Meratshwana- 
meaning ‗half‘ or sub-tribes. The use of Setswana phrases that are derogatory and 
prejudiced amount to what Sachdev & Bourhis‘s (1990) understanding is 
devalorization and stigmatisation of minority languages. In addition, as observed 
earlier, minority languages/tribes are marginalized and excluded from use in the 













We can also use Tswana proverbs to understand my prediction outlined above. 
Tswana proverbs influence political behaviours and attitudes that people generally 
have towards their political leaders. The following Tswana proverbs are more likely to 
impact on how Batswana (irrespective of ethnic identity) in general view government 
legitimacy: “Kgosi ke modingwana, ga e sebjwe” [The chief is a little god, no evil 
must be spoken of him]; “Bogosi boa tsaleloa, gabo loeloe” [Man should be born for 
kinship, not fight for it]; “Foko ja kgosi le ageloa mosako” [Always build a fence 
around the chief ward] (Wylie 1991). These Tswana proverbs are politically 
significant, both in terms of literal translations and how they relate to issues of 
government legitimacy, and democratic governance in general. In other words, the 
proverbs are more likely to influence political behaviour and actions, since these are 
deeply rooted and embedded in social and political fabric and structure of Botswana 
society. The political consequence of Tswana proverbs is that these serve to highlight 
tolerance levels demonstrated towards the traditional and modern political leadership. 
Furthermore, one of the factors that condition ethnic politics in Botswana is that, ―the 
Tswana culture pervade most of the country in that an overwhelming majority (around 
80 percent) belong to one of the eight major Tswana ethnic groups‖ (Molutsi 
1992:87). 
 
Consistent with my predictions that are highlighted above, past studies also reveal that 
there is always lack of legitimacy among some segments in society, with those people 
who share a common identity being more likely to identify with government political 
incumbents (Mattes 1999). And that people who are subjected to political subjugation 
are more likely to reject government legitimacy (Useem & Useem 1979; Mattes 
1999).  
 
2.5.2.5 Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity  
 
Hypothesis 8: There will be a weak relationship between the type of social identity 
and the level of national identity. More specifically Batswana who think of 
themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribal/ethnic group are more 













In using a more subjective dimension of identity, I expect a weak relationship 
between the types of social identity and the level of national identity because, people 
tend to accept that they are citizens of the country in which they live and at the same 
time maintain loyalty to their ethnic group. The logic of this expectation is that first 
and foremost Batswana will use national identity as a primary form of social 
identification. This implies that other forms of social identifications like language, 
tribe or religion will be subordinate to national identity. 
 
This logic is consistent with previous research on social identity that emphasises its 
multi-dimensional nature. In other words, social identity is an interlocking, 
overlapping and multiple layered phenomena (Vail 1989; Young 2002; Bannon, 
Miguel & Posner 2004; Posner 2004a). According to Young (2002:23) ethnic self-
awareness should not be perceived as standing in contradiction to national identity 
but: 
... a sense of involvement, concern and pride can be derived from one‘s 
knowledge of sharing a social category membership with others, even without 
necessarily having close personal relationships with knowing or having any 
material personal interest in their outcome (Abrams & Hogg 1990:3). 
 
As Mattes (1999:157) rightly postulates people are more likely to ―define themselves 
in terms of the groups to which they belong, rather than the larger political 
community, or nation, in which they live‖ It appears from past studies that granting 
citizenship in particular and national identity in general, is somewhat a contested issue 
and depends so much on one‘s type of social identity. This contentious relationship 
between social identity and national identity is consistent with the tradition of social 
constructivism that theorizes that: 
...National identity is not pre-given, but is largely constructed and produced by 
people as they develop and express their understandings of situations, events 
and other people as they arise. The impression of contingency deviates from 
opposed tendency which treats national identity as homogenous, determined 
phenomenon (Fevre & Thompson 1999:45). 
Although Fevre & Thompson (1999) are specifically making reference to the Welsh 
national identity, there is no doubt, that their theoretical and conceptual framework is 












view is also consistent with Tajfel‘s (1984) thesis that, nations are cultural and 
historical givens imposed upon us by socialization and social consensus.  
Furthermore, there are some differences with respect to the type of social identity and 
the level of national identity. Such differences are expected considering that they are 
variable factors that predispose some individuals to identify themselves in ethnic 
terms more than others (Verba 1965; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Mattes 2004)
16
. 
Differences in social identification can also be explained using social identity theory 
and the associated self-categorization theory. Accordingly: 
... Self-conception reflects a variable process of self-categorization, the 
cognitive grouping of the self as identical to some class of stimuli in contrast to 
some other stimuli. As is the case with all systems of natural categories... self-
categorizations can exist at different levels of abstractions related to class 
inclusion. That is, a given self-category (e.g. ―scientists‖) is seen as more 
abstract than another (e.g. ―biologist‖) to the extent that it can contain the other, 
but the other cannot contain it: all biologists are scientists, but not all scientists 
are biologists (Oakes, Haslam & Reynolds 1999:58). 
That is, self-identification and self-categorization are not only dynamic processes, but 
also dependent on the nature of social group relations in a given context and particular 
time. In fact, social group identities and national identity are found to be intricately 
bound together and not mutually exclusive, as previously suggested (Pye & Verba 
1965; Tajfel 1984; Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999; Banks & Banks 2001; Mattes 2004; 
Kamwangamalu 2007), a view consistent with what Southall (1970 cited in Young 
2002) terms interlocking and overlapping nature of multiple identities. 
 
2.5.2.6 Relationship between Social Identity and Interpersonal trust  
 
Hypothesis 9: There will be a weak relationship between the type of social identity 
and interpersonal trust. More specifically Batswana who think of themselves in terms 
of both majority and minority language/tribal/ethnic group are equally likely to 
discriminate members of out-groups.  
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I expect a weak relationship between the type of social identity and interpersonal 
trust. This is due to the fact that, there is the tendency for all people to judge and 
evaluate their group more favourably than other groups, thus, giving rise to 
stereotyping, social prejudice and ethnocentrism (Tajfel 1984; Robinson 1996). The 
observation of this investigator is that in Botswana stereotyping and social prejudice 
are more endemic among both majority and minority language/tribal/ethnic groups. 
For example, it is common (as observed earlier) for members of ethnic majority to 
refer to their minority counterparts using derogatory terms such moratshwana and or 
meratshwana. In the same breadth it is quite common for instance, for the Bakalanga 
(one of the minority tribal/language group) to refer to the Basarwa (also an ethnic 
minority group) as barwa (meaning outsiders), a term that has negative connotations 
as well.  
 
My conjecture as outlined above is consistent with Tajfel‘s (1984) proposition that 
generally people share some collective perception of themselves as a distinct social 
entity of ―us‖ as opposed to ―them.‖ That is, the perception of in-group and out-group 
homogeneity. In other words, people are more likely to be tolerant and develop strong 
negative feelings towards members of out-groups (Abrams & Hogg 1990; Mattes 
1999; Banks & Banks 2001). People‘s views and treatment of others is tightly linked 
to the assessment of themselves and their group (Mattes 1999:166). The more strongly 
people identify with a sub national group, the more likely they will develop strong 
negative feelings towards out-groups, or are less likely to  tolerate members of out-
groups (Mattes 1999:168). 
 
2.5.2.7 Relationship between Social Identity, Political Participation and voting 
 
Hypothesis 10: There will be a strong relationship between the type of social identity, 
political participation and voting. More specifically, the level of civic political 
participation will be the same for minority and majority language/tribal/ethnic groups. 
In terms of voting, more specifically those people who think of themselves in terms of 














I expect to find the same levels of civic political participation irrespective of the type 
of social identity in political activities. This is due to the perception and the belief that 
- - ntwa kgolo ke ya molomo and or- - mmualebe o bua la gagwe.
17
. These are 
Setswana proverbs that emphasize the desirability to solve problems peacefully, 
amicably and diplomatically. More specifically, I expect to find that ethnic minorities 
are as politically active as members of the majority. As stated earlier, increased civic 
participation has enormous benefits for ethnic minorities. It is more likely to lead to 
increased full social integration in decision-making processes. It also has the potential 
to allow ethnic minorities to assert their rights in promoting group interests in spheres 
of economics, politics and ethno-cultural issues. 
 
Looking at voting, I expect it to be an exception compared to civic participation. As 
stated earlier and for the same logic, I expect that members of minority groups are 
markedly less likely to vote in national elections. In addition, I predict that in 
Botswana, ethnic mobilization is generally weak to an extent that it can lead to 
significant increase in ethnic voting patterns. This is because I expect to find that 
ethno-political groups are not yet politicized. However, this does not imply that ethnic 
minorities are not a dissatisfied lot. As observed earlier, ethnic minorities perceive 
some sections of the Botswana Constitution as discriminatory (despite recent 
amendments). It is worth noting that the struggle by ethnic minorities is motivated by 
mild demands. It entails demands that are cultural in nature such as for policy 
changes, targeted constitutional amendments and the right of schooling in non-titular 
languages. This is not a demand for autonomy but rather for recognition and 
accommodation in what is perceived as a plural and multi-ethnic nation state. 
 
2.5.2 .8 Relationship between Social Identity and Government Legitimacy  
 
Hypothesis11: There will be a strong relationship between the type of social identity 
and the level of legitimacy of government. More specifically, people who think of 
themselves as members of minority/language/tribal/ethnic groups are less likely to see 
the political system as legitimate. 
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I expect people who think of themselves in terms of numerically smaller social 
groups, to perceive government institutions less favourably than majority social 
identity groups. This is because as observed earlier, self identified minorities feel 
marginalized particularly by the government language policy that gives special status 
to Setswana and English as the national and official languages respectively. In 
particular, I expect minority groups to resent the adoption of policies that promote 
cultural assimilation at the expense of their indigenous language and cultures. Such 
policies also help to entrench the supremacy of Setswana that is the language of the 
ruling class (Mooko 2006). This expectation is somewhat consistent with the 
hypothesis by Mattes (1999) that the more likely a person identify with a sub national 






































Chapter 2 identified the research question(s) and theoretical issues and perspectives 
pertinent to this study. In Chapter 3, I describe the methodology used to investigate 
them. An introduction to the methodology was provided in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1. 
This chapter aims to build on that introduction and provides assurance that 
appropriate procedures are followed. The Chapter is organised around four major 
topics:  the description and justification of research design and methods used in this 
study, operationalization of constructs (i.e. independent and dependent variables) to 
measure hypothesized relationship and issues around; data analysis and limitations of 
the study. 
 
3.2 Research Design and Methods 
 
This research draws on Afrobarometer survey data to answer descriptive and 
explanatory research questions. That is: (i) the extent to which Botswana can be 
considered ethnically homogeneous when using language, tribal affiliation and social 
identity; (ii) and whether any observed differences in language, tribal affiliation or 
social identity correlate with the key political factors of national identity, 
interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and legitimacy of government. The 
descriptive and explanatory hypotheses are tested using existing Afrobarometer 
survey data collected across Botswana during Rounds 1 (November-December 1999), 
2 (2003) and 3 (May-June 2005).
18
 The research draws on survey data from 1200 
respondents (from each of the three Rounds) who are voting age, e.g. 18 and above. 
Half of the respondents were women and the other half were men 
(http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.2pdf). This sample size was big enough to 
allow for the interpretation of the results to be generalised to the larger population 
(Johnson & Joslyn 1999)  
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I use the Afrobarometer data sets for a number of reasons. First, these are preferred 
because they employ reliable and standardized survey questionnaires to probe 
citizen‘s political attitudes, behaviours and public opinions in African countries. The 
Afrobarometer is a series of comparative national surveys that, among other things 
measure the political orientations of the ordinary Africans using face-to-face 
interviews (The Afrobarometer Network 2006). Additionally, the use of survey 
research allows for the study of a range of human attitudes that previously have been 
virtually impossible to observe.  Secondly, Afrobarometer surveys use standardized 
sets of instruments developed over a long period of time by established authorities. 
Furthermore, the surveys are based on probability sample representing the adult 
population 18 years and above (www.afrobarometer.org; The Afrobarometer Network 
2006). In addition, they have been piloted, applied to several African studies hence 
tested in terms of validity and reliability (The Afrobarometer Network 2006). 
 
Thirdly, these are nationally representative samples drawn through a multi-stage 
stratified, clustered sampling procedures, with sample sizes sufficient to yield a 
margin of sampling error of +/-3% at the 95% confidence level. Details of 
questionnaire design, accuracy, validity, reliability and sampling framework are 
available at www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.2pdf. Lastly, the use of existing 
Afrobarometer data sets is consistent with the emerging practices and trends, in 
quantitative social research literature. Stranfield & Dennis (1993) note that the use of 
existing data sets and secondary data sets enable researchers to tap into the vast logic 
of inquiry, technical store of knowledge. In this regard, Afrobarometer data sets are 
increasingly used by a number of researchers including: Norris & Mattes (2003); 
Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Mattes (2004); Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 
(2005); and Bratton & Mattes (2007). It is to the examination of the operational 
definitions of constructs, as used in this study to measure the hypothesized 
relationships that I now turn. 
 
3.3 Measurement of Independent Variables 
 
This section deals with the operational definitions and measurement of the following 















Languages, dialects and accents provide one putatively objective dimension of 
ethnicity and a means of differentiating ethnic or tribal groups. This is tangible and 
audible, that is a system of sounds and movements made by the human body and 
decoded by the listener‘s auditory system that one can hear (Mattes 1999; Ovando 
2001). Language, is a marker of ethnic identity, and ―... not only has real function as 
the glue which holds a culture together but also has a symbolic role vis-a-vis the 
larger community or state‖ (Hannum 1996: 459). As a cognitive aspect, language also 
acts as a tool for the expression of thought and an instrument of communicating 
information, values, attitudes, skills and aspirations—a system of signs and symbols 
that have socially determined meaning (Beebe & Giles 1984; Abrams & Hogg 1990; 
Andersson & Janson 1997; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Oakes 2001; Ovando 2001; 
Kertzer & Dominique 2002; Mazonde 2002; Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; 
Mooko 2006). The following Afrobarometer questions are used to measure language 
in nominal terms: What language do you speak most at home? (Round 1, question 
111); Which Botswana language is your home language? (Round 2, question 83 and 
Round 3 question 3) 
 
3.3.1.2 Majority/Minority Languages 
 
Today the issue demographic size and numbers often translates into struggle for 
power particularly between majority and minority groups. The goal of this ‗war‘ of 
numbers is to increase the economic and political power of an ethnic group relative to 
other groups. Increase in relative population size may translate into an increase in 
political power and hopefully enhanced political representation in decision-making 
processes (Bookman 1997). Botswana‘s ethno-political landscape is not immune to 
the relative struggle between demographic size and political power. For example, 
Nyati-Ramahobo (2002) posits that in a number of Botswana‘s districts, the majority 
language/tribal groups that are recognized by the constitution are actually a numerical 
minority. 
 
In Botswana the label majority and minority languages often denotes numerical 












majority versus minority language groups are also problematic. In this study, I use the 
conventional understanding of these labels. The majority language groups are the 
eight tribes listed in Section 78 of the Botswana‘s original Constitution: Bakgatla, 
Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa. 
These are all Setswana speakers. Minority language groups are mainly non-Setswana 
speakers (with a few Setswana speaking groups included) and these are not listed in 
the original Constitution. These are Bakalanga, Bakgalagadi, Basarwa, Basubiya, 
Bayeyi, Hambukushu and OvaHerero. The Setswana speaking groups referred to as 
minority include Babirwa, Bakhurutshe, Bakgatla-ba ga Mmanaana and Batswapong 
(Andersson & Janson 1997; Batibo & Tsonope 2000; Batibo & Smieja 2000; 
Mazonde 2002; Hasselbring 2000; Mooko 2006). The consequence of this 
demographic arrangement is that political power lies with the Setswana speaking 
groups that is the eight tribes listed in Section 78 of the Botswana‘s original 
constitution. This means that the minority language groups are politically 
marginalized. 
 
Besides the actual responses to the actual language questions, I also use majority 
language group to refer to the eight Setswana speaking tribes that are listed in the 
original constitution of Botswana. In other words, in terms of the demographic size 
versus political power nexus, these are the core and politically influential group. 
Minority language groups refer to both non-Setswana and Setswana speaking tribes 
not listed in the original constitution. These are politically marginalized and in the 
periphery. 
 
3.3.2 Tribal Affiliation 
 
Tribal affiliation is another putatively objective dimension of ethnicity and refers to 
an ethnic group, tribe or tribal group. Tribe is a political entity (Bennett 2006) and a 
tangible, visible, physical characteristics and a form of cleavage (Morton, Murray & 
Ramsay 1989; Mattes 1999). In Botswana the term ‗tribe‘ has different uses. It can 
refer to a multi-ethnic political unit or an ethnic identity. The use of tribe can also 
imply single and mutually-exclusive ‗tribal‘ identities (Bennett 2002). The Setswana 












Africa, the use of the word tribe in Botswana is not seen as pejorative, and is thus 
used frequently in face to face interactions (Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989).  
 
Tribe as a variable is measured using the following Afrobarometer question (Round 3 
question 79) yielding nominal categorical data: What is your tribe? 
 
3.3.2.1 Majority/Minority Tribes 
 
I start by locating the conceptualization and operationalization of majority/minority 
tribe in the context of the debate around demographic size and political power. As 
pointed out earlier, the problematic nature of sheer demographic size and political 
power once again comes to the fore. Demographic size also implies political 
legitimacy to partake in political decision-making processes and to express ethnic 
demands in a more organized fashion. Size affects participation and influences the 
right to make demands on the political system. This means that groups that are of 
insufficient size may even lack recognition within the nation state (Bookman 1997; 
2002) 
 
In this study, the use of majority tribe denotes numerical strength and significance 
(Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003. In other words, the numerically superior 
members of the population (i.e. tribal majorities), speak major or dominant languages. 
These are the eight tribes listed in Section 78 of Botswana‘s Constitution (original): 
Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and 
Batlokwa (Republic of Botswana (undated)
19
; Andersson & Janson 1997; Hasselbring 
2000; Republic of Botswana 2000; Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; Solway 
2004; Mooko 2006). These are the Setswana speaking language groups (as seen 
earlier). They are the core group and wield political power and influence. Minority 
tribes not listed in the original constitution of Botswana. Minority tribes are mainly 
non-Tswana speaking although there are a few Setswana speaking tribes in this 
                                                 
19
 Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Botswana Constitution have been reviewed in 2005 with the view to 
making them tribally neutral. This was in line with the recommendations of the Balopi Commission of 
Inquiry‘s report of 2000 and the subsequent adoption of Government White Paper No. 2 of 2002 as 
approved by the National Assembly. However, people who belong to linguistic and tribal minorities 
feel that the issue of neutrality has not been adequately addressed by the constitutional amendments 
since other pieces of legislation that are perceived to be discriminatory such as the Tribal Territories 












category. The non-Tswana speaking minority tribes include: Bakalanga, Bakgalagadi, 
Basarwa, Basubiya, Bayeyi, Hambukushu and OvaHerero. Setswana speaking 
minority tribes are: Babirwa, Bakhurutshe, Bakgatla-ba-ga Mmanaana and 
Batswapong (Schapera 1952; Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Andersson & Janson 
1997; Batibo & Tsonope 2000; Hasselbring 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 
2004; Bennett 2006; Mooko 2006). As stated earlier these are politically 
marginalized, peripheral without any political influence. 
 
3.3.3 Social Identity 
 
I use Social identity in contrast to language and tribe to understand the complex 
nature of social identification in Botswana. It is a far more subjective dimension of 
ethnicity. According to Tajfel (1978; 1984), social identity is that part of a person‘s 
self-concept which derives from his or her knowledge of membership of a social 
group, together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership. In other words, it is based on how people define themselves that is, their 
collective perception of themselves as a distinct social entity of ―us‖ as opposed to 
―them‖. For example, people may identify themselves using different forms of social 
affiliations such as gender, nationality, race, religion, class, occupation, language, 
tribe, political party and so forth (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Mattes 1999; Mattes 2002; 
Burgess 2002; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004). Social identity is measured using the 
nominal variable We have spoken to many people in Botswana and they have all 
described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of 
their language, religion, race, and others describe themselves in economic terms such 
as working class, middle class, or farmer. Besides being a citizen of Botswana which 
specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost? (Question 82 & 54 Round 
1 & 2). 
 
3.4 Analysis of Descriptive Hypotheses 
 
I used micro-level analysis to test the descriptive hypotheses. In other words, the 
individual citizen is the unit of analysis. For purpose of analyzing Round 1 data, on 
the language(s) spoken most at home, the following were coded as: majority 
language(s) [Setswana]; minority languages [Sesotho, Afrikaans, Chewa, Damara, 












other category]. Round 1 & 3 data on social identity was coded thus: majority 
languages/tribal groups were recoded as political majority; minority languages/tribal 
groups as political minority and responses like religion, occupation/class, race and 
don‘t differentiate myself were coded as „other‟ category.  
 
Turning to the analysis of Round 2 data, the following home language(s) were coded 
as minority: Sekalanga, Sesarwa, Sesobeya, Sekgalagadi, Seherero, Sembukushu and 
Seyei; Setswana as majority while English, French, Portuguese and Kiswahili were 
coded as „other‟ category. Whereas for Round 2, broad social identity categories like 
language/tribe/ethnic group, national identity and the ‗other‘ category included race 
religion and occupation.  
 
For Round 3, Setswana was coded as the majority language while Sesarwa, 
Sekgalagadi, Sesobea, Sekalanga, Seherero, Sembukushu, Sebirwa, Sengologa and 
Seyei were coded as minority languages. With respect to tribal affiliation variable, the 
following were coded as majority tribes: Mokwena, Mongwato, and Mongwaketse. 
While minority tribes included: Mokalanga, Mokgalagadi, Moyei, Herero, Mosarwa, 
Mosobeya and Mokgalagadi. While the social identity variable, was recorded into 
primary social identity groups such as nationality, language and tribe.  
 
As I pointed out earlier, the Oxford Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary defines the term 
homogeneous as referring to ―people that all the same or all of the same type‖ 
(Hornby 2005: 717). In this study I take the common wisdom as referring to the 
proportion of the population that belongs to eight major tribes and or speaks the 
country‘s major language, Setswana. It posits that 90% of the population belongs to 
Tswana tribes and considers Setswana as the language ―spoken most at home.‖ 
 
Finally, the descriptive hypotheses were tested using univariate statistics such as 
frequency distribution, percentages and range. These statistical procedures were 















3.5 Measurement of Dependent Variables 
 
In order to examine the second aspect of the common wisdom, that Botswana has no 
politically relevant identity structures, I now need to test whether the as-of-yet under-
appreciated diversity of Botswana that I expect to find actually matters politically? To 
do this I use the following dependent variables to test the extent to which these 
observed differences align with national identity, interpersonal trust, political 
participation, voting and the legitimacy of government. The idea is to test whether 
differences in language, tribal affiliation and social identity are politicized. This may 
be a factor that possibly helps to explain Botswana‘s exceptionality as one of the few 
politically and economically successful nation states in Africa. 
3.5.1 National Identity 
 
Researchers disagree over the definition, measurement and expected political 
consequences of national identity. In other words, research is generally marred by 
confusing array of terms associated with national identity like patriotism, national 
loyalty, love, pride and deep affection for one‘s nation state (Dowley & Silver 2004; 
Mattes 1999; 2004; Huddy & Khatib 2007). In this study, I adopt a conceptualization 
of national identity that is grounded in social identity theory. A social identity is 
typically defined as awareness of one‘s objective membership in the group and a 
psychological sense of group attachment (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979). 
Consistent with this definition, I draw on Huddy & Khatib‘s (2007) definition of 
national identity as a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation and 
measure it with questions that typically assess social identities.  
 
Specifically, national identity is measured by establishing whether or not the 
respondents are proud of their national citizenship. This is done through the use of the 
following questions: It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana; You 
would want your children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana; All people 
who were born in this country, regardless of what group they belong to, should be 
treated as equal citizens of Botswana; It is desirable to create one united nation out of 












had to choose between being a Motswana and being a.... which of these two groups do 
you feel most strongly attached to? (Question 57, Round 2); and let us suppose that 
you had to choose between being a Motswana and being a____ which of these two 
groups do you feel strongly attached to? (Question 82, Round 3). 
 
3.5.2 Interpersonal Trust 
 
Interpersonal trust is a fundamental element of social and political trust. It is an 
interdisciplinary concept that can be difficult to define, has several dimensions like 
social, economic, political, cultural and religious implications. People objectively and 
subjectively perceive, conceptualize and interpret trust differently. Specifically trust 
refers to a set of political beliefs, values, behavioural orientations and attitudes shaped 
by life experiences and political socialization. These trusting values, norms and 
behavioural orientations underlie the system of mutual security, cooperation, restraint, 
accommodation and acceptance of others and tolerance of differences (Diamond 
1994). In this study, I take political and social trust meaning political moderation and 
accommodation styles of political behaviour. It is facilitated by structural patterns of 
social interaction at the mass level and implies: 
...tolerance for opposing political beliefs and positions, and for social and 
cultural differences... a sense of trust in other political actors and in the 
social environment; a willingness to compromise, springing from intrinsic 
belief in the necessity and desirability of compromise; a certain civility of 
political discourse and respect for other views (Diamond 1994: 10) 
 
Consistent with this definition, I use the following questions to measure trust: Most 
people can be trusted/ you can‘t be too careful (Question 43, Round 1); Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very 
careful in dealing with people? (Questions 83, Round 3); How much do you trust each 
of the following types of people? People from your own ethnic group (Questions 84c, 




















3.5.3 Political Participation 
 
We can identify two forms of political participation that is conventional and non-
conventional forms of involvement. Conventional political participation refers to the 
extent to which citizens are interested, actively discuss, and attend political and public 
meetings, election rallies and party campaigns. It also involves voting and communal 
contacting and working for a political party or candidate. Non-conventional 
participation involves actively taking part in mass actions such as protest marches, 
boycotts, strikes or demonstrations (Pye & Verba 1965; Nie & Verba 1975; Branson 
1994; Bratton & Van De Walle 1997; Mattes 1999; Norris 2002a & b; Putnam 2002; 
Dowley & Silver 2004; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). 
 
I use the following questions to measure conventional participation: In the past year 
have you contacted a government or political party official about some important 
problem or to give them your views (Question, 33, Round 1); here is a list of actions 
that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you 
personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do 
this if you had the chance: attend a community meeting (Question 25b, Round 2); join 
others to raise an issue (Question 25c, Round 2); attend a community meeting 
(Question 31, Round 3); and got together with others to raise an issue? (Question 31b, 
Round 3). Non-conventional participation is measured using the following question: 





Voting refers to electoral behaviour (act of voting or not voting), electoral turnout or 
voter turnout. It is an aspect of political participation and as an electoral process 
includes registration, casting a vote, taking part in local and national elections, 
possession of valid voter registration documents and membership to a given political 
party (Branson 1994; Bratton & Van De Walle 1997; Mattes 1999; Norris 2002a & b; 
Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). In this study, voting is treated as a separate 
variable from political participation, because of its uniqueness. As Dalton (2002:33) 












political participation with the act of voting. But if you view politics from the citizen‘s 
perspective, participation is not limited to voting...‖ 
 
Voting is measured using the following questions: With regard to the most 
recent…national elections, which statement is true for you? (Question 89 & 30, 
Round 1 & 3). 
 
3.5.5 Government Legitimacy  
 
Legitimacy is the sense that the occupants of government institutions have the right to 
make binding decisions, and that people ought to obey these decisions whether or not 
they agree with them, or whether they happen to support the incumbents who make 
those decisions (Diamond 1994). John Stuart Mill succinctly sums this definition 
when he says that: 
The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing 
to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable 
obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and be able to do what 
is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do 
what it requires of them to enable it to fulfil its purpose. The word ―do‖ is 
to be understood as including forbearances as well as acts (Cited in 
Diamond 1994: 11). 
 
This conceptualization is also similar, to Easton‘s (1975: 451) operationalization of 
legitimacy as ―the conviction that it is right and proper ... to obey the authorities and 
abide by the requirements of the regime.‖ However, Easton (1975: 453-56) makes a 
qualification to the effect that, a distinction has to be made between ―legitimacy per se 
from compliance attitudes and behaviour.‖ In addition, Lamb (2005) notes that 
legitimacy is a specific value that individuals and groups ascribe to things that they 
believed should be supported and sustained. In other words, to claim that something is 
legitimate is to give moral support or normative reason to obey, support or refrain 
from opposing it. Legitimacy of government is measured using the following 
questions: Which of the following statements is closet to your view? Our government 
has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they 
agree with them (Question 61, Round 1); A) It is important to obey the government in 
power no matter who you voted for B) .It is not necessary to obey the laws of a 













3.6 Analysis of Explanatory Hypotheses 
 
I also used micro-level analysis to test explanatory hypotheses. The analysis involved 
recoding of both the independent and dependent variables. For example: don‘t knows, 
refused and missing data were recoded as system missing. Whereas No‘s and never 
were recoded as middle categories (e.g. Bratton & Mattes 2007). Initially, ordinal 
variable in a likert-type of scale were recoded as follows: Agree and very strongly 
Agree responses were collapsed into a single category which was re-labelled: Agree. 
Old value labels like Disagree and Strongly Disagree were also collapsed into a singe 
category which was re-labelled Disagree. Neither Agree/Nor Disagree responses were 
re-labelled as Not Sure. Political participation and voting variables like: contacting a 
government or political party official and discussing politics were simply collapsed 
into yes and no categories. Variables dealing with interpersonal trust were recoded in 
terms of no trust, moderate trust and great trust. National identity variables like 
choosing between being a Motswana and being a... were either collapsed into Yes/No 
responses or Agree, Not Sure or Disagree. And legitimacy of government variables 
like obeying laws of government in power were recoded into Always, Not Sure and 
Unnecessary. The decision to reduce 5 point scale to 3 point scale was informed by 
the use of nominal level measurement which does not require ranking or ordering of 
variables. 
 
The second stage of the analysis involved recoding of the dependent variables into a 
five point, four point and three point likert type scales. ‗Don‘t knows‘ and ‗refused to 
answer‘ responses were moved to the middle of the scale especially the variables 
dealing with attitudes while those not dealing with attitudes like voting were moved to 
the lower end of the recode scale. Basically, the testing of the dependent variables on 
both dichotomous and ordinal scales does not reveal any significant shift in the nature 
of the association. At first glance, using Cramer‘s V without controlling for a third 
variable (like the case is when using regression or multivariate analysis) may seem 
superficial. On the contrary, these simple statistics powerfully demonstrate the general 
lack of strong association between the key political factors explored in this study. 














Testing explanatory hypotheses involved reading data files, selecting cases, and 
recoding responses into new categories, re-labelling value labels and finally 
interpreting the results (e.g. Green & Salkind 2003). The explanatory hypotheses were 
further tested through the use of bivariate statistics such as cross-tabulation, and 
Cramer‘s V tests. The Cramer‘s V statistic was preferred because it is frequently used 
when dealing with nominal and categorical measures of association. It has the 
advantage over the chi-square since it is capable of not only establishing the existence 
or lack of relationship, but also the strength of such a relationship.  
 
The Cramer‘s V also has an advantage over other nominal measures of strength of 
association such as Lamda and Gamma. In fact, unlike Lamda, the value of Cramer‘s 
V is not dependent on which variable is designated as the dependent variable. 
Similarly, the use of Gamma is limited to the measurement of relationships between 
ordinal variables (Fraenkel & Wallen 1996; Arsham 1994-2009). In addition, 
inferential statistics such as, the One-way ANOVA tests, were used to discern the 
nature of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.  
 
One-way ANOVA was helpful in illuminating ‗between sample differences‘ and 
‗within sample differences‘ among the means (Greogory 1978:160). After obtaining a 
statistically significant F-test from the analysis of One-way ANOVA, the Post-Hoc (in 
particular Tukey‘s B test), a comparison technique, was used to determine which of 
the Means in the sample contributed to the effect that is, the groups that were 
particularly different from each other (Arsham 1994-2009). The Null hypothesis was 





The main limitation of this study stems from the fact that the Afrobarometer 
questionnaire was translated from English into the national language, Setswana, for 
interview purposes. It is possible that the use of Setswana might have posed 
communication problems for non-Setswana speakers. An additional caveat identified 
by Bannon, Miguel and Posner (2004), is equally relevant to this study—as they draw 












rightly observe, questions 82 and 54 (Round 1 & 2 respectively), from which the 
dependent variable i.e. social identity, is constructed explicitly bars respondents from 
describing themselves in terms of nationality—the questions ask respondents-besides 
being a—which specific group do you feel you belong. The question wording is bound 
to create confusion, since the possibility that the respondents might have considered 
national identity cannot be ruled out. In fact some of the respondents did identify 
themselves in terms of nationality—this is why in the coding, a separate category (for 
the purpose of analysis in this study), was created to accommodate such eventuality. 
Other Studies (for example Norris 2002a & b; Bratton and Mattes 2007) also 
acknowledge the possibility for question wording to cause confusion among 
respondents. 
 
The other methodological limitation is that the Excel and SPSS formats of the data 
sets (including code book) for Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey do not have 
listings of primary social identity groups. Instead, these formats only provide broad 
social identity categories, particularly with respect to language and tribe (ethnic 
group). These were combined into a single category labelled, language/tribe/ethnic 
group thus hindering the analytical process.  
 
3.7 Ethical Consideration 
 
Finally, since this study relied on the use of existing data sets, that is, Rounds 1 
(1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) of the Afrobarometer survey—this did not pose any 





























Chapter 4 tests the first part of the common wisdom that claims Botswana is 
homogeneous ethnically. It bases this claim mainly on estimates of linguistic diversity 
that approximately 90% of Batswana share a common language (i.e. Setswana). 
Specifically, the chapter examines the extent to which Botswana can be considered as 
homogeneous using language, tribal affiliation and social identity. It is organized 
around the presentation and interpretation of the results in relation to the research 
problem and descriptive hypotheses. In order to examine the patterns, the descriptive 
results are further disaggregated according to district and rural-urban location.  
 
4.2 Language: An Objective Dimension  
 
This section uses descriptive statistics to examine the extent to which Botswana can 
be adequately characterized as homogeneous, using language, a more objective 
dimension of ethnic identity. It does this by testing the common wisdom which claims 
that 90% of Batswana speak Setswana. I use Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) 
Afrobarometer survey data to test the common wisdom.  
 
Round 1 asks respondents about the language that is ―spoken most at home.‖ The 
respondent‘s answers are summarized in Table 4.1. Almost all of the respondents (96 
percent) say that Setswana is the language ―spoken most at home.‖ Round 2 ask an 
apparently slightly different question about respondent‘s ―home language‖ but which 
find quite different results. The respondent‘s answers are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Most of the respondents (79 percent) identify Setswana as the ―home language,‖ but a 
sizeable (21%) consider minority languages as their ―home language.‖ More 
specifically, four and 11 percent of the respondents consider Sekgalagadi and 
Sekalanga respectively, (i.e. two of the minority languages) as the ―home language.‖ 
Round 3 also asked the respondents to indicate their ―home language,‖ and the 
respondent‘s answers are summarized in Table 4.1. Again, most of the respondents 
(79) identify Setswana as their home language, while a significant (23%) number of 












and nine percent of the respondents identify Sekgalagadi and Sekalanga respectively 
as the ―home languages.‖  
 
Table 4.1: Language (s) Spoken Most at Home /Home Language (s) (1999-2005) in Percent 
Language(s) Round 1 (1999): 
Language(s) Spoken 
Most at Home 
 
Round 2 (2003): Home 
Language(s) 
Round 3 (2005): Home 
Language(s) 
Majority Language:    
Setswana 96 79 79 
Languages Minority:    
Sekalanga NA 11 9 
Sekgalagadi NA 4 4 
Sembukushu NA 2 2 
Sebirwa NA NA 2 
Sesarwa NA 1 2 
Sesobea NA 1 1 
Seyei NA 1 1 
Sengologa NA NA 1 
Otjiherero/Seherero <1 1 1 
Afrikaans <1 NA NA 
Kiswahili <2 NA NA 
Chewa <1 NA NA 
Damara <1 NA NA 
Ndebele <1 NA NA 
Sesotho <1 NA NA 
Shona <1 NA NA 
Silozi <1 NA NA 
Zulu <1 Na NA 
Sub Total: 8 21 23 
Other    
English 1 <1 NA 
German <1 NA NA 
French NA <1 NA 
Portuguese NA <1 NA 
Other <1 <1 NA 












Missing Data 1 NA NA 
NB: NA denotes Not Applicable                        < denotes less than 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1, 2 & 3) 
 
 
Round 1 result reveal the predominance of Setswana as the language ―spoken most at 
home.‖ But while Round 1 results are consistent with the common wisdom‘s 
suggestion that 90% of Batswana speak a common language, thus disconfirming the 
prediction (Hypothesis 1) that linguistically, Botswana is less homogeneous than the 
common wisdom suggests. However, Round 2 & 3 results reveal that in using ―home 
language,‖ the level of heterogeneity is slightly higher than the common wisdom 
wants us to believe. 
 
To address Hypothesis 1 further, I seek to find out whether Botswana‘s minority 
languages are concentrated in certain parts of the country (such as rural areas or in 
peripheral regions) or they are evenly spread across the country? I breakdown, 
language into district and rural/urban location and the results are summarized in 
Tables 4.2a & b.  
 
Table 4.2a: Breakdown of Language by District in Botswana (1999- 2005) 
Language(s) 
 
District Location Round 1:1999 
(Percent): Spoken 















































































































































































































































































































NB: NA denotes Not Applicable                        < denotes less than 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1, 2 & 3) 
 
 
Table 4.1a shows the breakdown of language by district in Botswana. Disaggregating 
Round 1(1999) results by district reveal that most of the respondents say that 
Setswana is the language that is ―spoken most at home.‖ For example in all the 
sampled districts, 90% or more of the respondents identify Setswana as ―spoken most 
at home.‖ Round 2 results presents a slightly different picture. First, Setswana is 
consistently regarded as the ―home language‖ across all the sampled districts. Second, 
in 3 out of the 13 sampled districts, 90% or more of the respondents consider 
Setswana as the language ―spoken most at home.‖ In the other sampled districts, the 
frequencies for Setswana are lower than 90% and the lowest figure of 21% reported in 
the Ghanzi district. Round 3 results for majority language are somewhat similar to 
those obtained in Round 2. Six of the districts have frequencies of more than 90% 












are less than 90%. The lowest frequency for Setswana as the ―home language‖ is 13% 
reported in the Ghanzi district. 
 
Specifically, Table 4.1a presents the breakdown of minority languages by district. 
Round 1 results show that, the distribution of minority language groups appears to be 
isolated in certain parts of the country. For example, two percent of the respondents in 
the Kgalagadi District identified Afrikaans as the language ―spoken most at home.‖ In 
the Selebi-Phikwe administrative district, 13% of the sampled respondents say that 
Sekalanga is the language that is ―spoken most at home.‖ In contrast, Round 2 results 
reveal widespread distribution of minority language groups and the greatest 
concentration is in several districts. Sekalanga is considered the ―home language‖ in 
the following districts: Gaborone (11%); Central (18%); Jwaneng (25%); South East 
(13%); Francistown (31%) and North East (41%). Sekgalagadi is considered the home 
language in the following districts: Kgalagadi (44%) and Ghanzi (58%). Seyei (13%) 
and Otjiherero (13%) are considered as ―home languages‖ in Jwaneng and North 
West/Ngamiland Districts. Lastly Sembukushu (16%) is identified as the home 
language in North West/Ngamiland District.  
 
Similarly, Round 3 results reflect a wide distribution of minority languages across the 
country as well as concentration in certain districts in the country. Sekalanga is 
considered the ―home language‖ in the following districts: Gaborone (10%); Central 
(14%); Francistown (25%) and North East (63%). Sekgalagadi is considered the home 
language in Jwaneng (13%); Ghanzi (50%) and Kgalagadi (56%). Sesarwa is 
identified as the home language in Chobe (28%) and Ghanzi (25%) districts. 
Sengologa (13%) and Sembukushu (24%) are identified as home languages in Ghanzi 




















Table 4.1b: Distribution of Minority Languages by District in Percent (1999- 2005) 
District Round 1: Minority 
Language(s) Spoken Most at 
Home 
Round 2: Minority Home 
Language(s) 
Round 3: Minority Home 
Language(s) 
Central <1 21 25 
Francistown - 37 25 
Gaborone - 14 11 
Jwaneng - 38 13 
Selebi-Phikwe 13 - 3 
South East - 13 3 
Lobatse - - 4 
Kgalagadi 2 47 65 
Kweneng - 8 8 
Ghanzi - 78 88 
Southern - 8 1 
Orapa - 13 - 
North East - 44 63 
North West/Ngamiland - 33 14 
Kgatleng - - 2 
Chobe - - 44 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey data (Round 1, 2 & 3) 
 
Table 4.1b presents the summary of the distribution of minority languages by district. 
Round1 results show that the distribution of minority languages is isolated in certain 
parts of the country. For example, 13% of the sampled respondents in the Selebi-
Phikwe administrative District identified minority languages as ―spoken most at 
home.‖ In contrast, Round 2 results reveal widespread distribution and greatest 
concentration of minority languages in the following districts: Gaborone (14%); North 
West/Ngamiland (33%); Orapa (13%); Jwaneng (38%); South East (13%); 
Francistown (37%); North East (44%); Kgalagadi (47%) and Ghanzi (78%). 
Similarly, Round 3 results reflect a wide distribution and concentration of minority 
languages across the country. These are as follows: Gaborone (11%); Central (25%); 
North West/Ngamiland (24%); Ghanzi (88%); Francistown (25%); Chobe (44%); 
North East (63%); Kgatleng (14%); Jwaneng (13%) and Kgalagadi (65%). 
 
These results have two important implications. First, Round 1 results with respect to 
language ―spoken most at home,‖ in particular, are consistent with the common 
wisdom that posits that 90% of Botswana‘s population speaks Setswana. Secondly, 
Round 1 results disconfirm Hypothesis 1 that predicts that linguistically Botswana is 












& 3 results regarding the ―home language‖ are not consistent with the common 
wisdom. They reveal that lines of cleavages along the language dimension do exist in 
Botswana. In addition, in some instances the distribution of minority languages across 
the districts appears to be concentrated but at the same time more widespread than is 
generally anticipated. 
 
A further disaggregation of the results in Rounds 1, 2 & 3 by urban-rural location as 
summarized in Table 4.3 reveal the predominance of Setswana as the language spoken 
most at home/home language in the country. For example, in Round 1 (1999), 94% 
compared to 98% of the respondents in urban and rural areas respectively, identify 
Setswana as the language spoken most at home. This is consistent with the common 
wisdom. The breakdown for minority language groups for Round 1 is somewhat 
sketchy. Possibly this is because districts like Ghanzi, North East, Kgalagadi and 
North West/Ngamiland (refer to Table 4.2) that have a sizeable proportion on 
minority language speakers are not part of the 1999 survey sample.  
 
Table 4.3: Breakdown of Language by Rural/Urban Location in Botswana (1999- 2005) 
Language(s) Spoken Most at 
Home? Home Language(s) 












































































































NB: NA denotes Not Applicable                        < denotes less than 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1, 2 & 3) 
 
In spite of this apparent sampling limitation, Round 2 & 3 results reveal that on the 












(14 & 15%) areas. However, there is a possibility that minority language groups are 
more likely to be concentrated in rural than urban areas. This is reflected in the 
distribution of two of the most significant minority languages that is Sekalanga and 
Sekgalagadi. For example, the proportion for Sekalanga speakers is 7% and 9% 
(Round 3 & 2 respectively) for urban areas. In contrast, the proportion for rural areas 
is 11% and 13% (Round 3 & 2 respectively). Similarly, Sekgalagadi is reportedly 
spoken by 2 percent of the respondents (in Round 2 & 3 respectively) in urban areas 
compared to 5% and 6% (Round 3 & 2 respectively) in rural areas. 
 
In conclusion, Round 1 results generally reveal the predominance of Setswana as the 
―language spoken most at home‖ in both rural and urban areas. Rounds 2 & 3 also 
reflect the dominance of Setswana as the home language, but at the same time show a 
sizeable percentage of respondents (relative to Botswana‘s population of close to two 
million) who identify minority languages such as Sekalanga and Sekgalagadi as their 
―home languages.‖  
 
4.3 Tribal Affiliation: An Objective Dimension  
 
In Round 3, respondents are asked to indicate their tribe, and the respondent‘s answers 
are summarized in Table 4.4. These results reveal that the respondents (members of 
majority and minority tribes) generally, cite their respective tribal affiliation. For 
example, the frequencies for the significant majority tribes are as follows: Mongwato 
(16%), Mokgatla, Mokwena and Mongwaketse (9% each). Similarly the frequencies 
for the significant minority tribes are as follows: Mokalanga (15%), Mokgalagadi & 
Motswapong (7% each) and Mmirwa (4%).  
 
Table 4.4: Tribal Affiliation in Botswana in Percent 
Tribal Affiliation Afrobarometer, Round 3: 2005 


































Motswana Only 3 
Refused <1 
NB: < denotes less than 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
On the whole, 42% compared to 54% of minority and majority tribes respectively use 
their tribal affiliation as a primary form of ethnic identification. These figures 
disprove the common wisdom‘s suggestion that Botswana consists primarily of 
Setswana speaking tribes. Thus the results lend support to Hypothesis 2 where it I 
predict that the level of tribal affiliation is higher than what the common wisdom 
suggests. 
 
Having established that tribal affiliation in Botswana is much more diverse than the 
90% level of homogeneity proposed by the common wisdom, it is now important to 
find out: whether or not the heterogeneity revealed by the nationwide frequencies is 
evenly spread across the country? Or is Botswana rather made up of a series of 
internally homogeneous areas which create heterogeneity across the larger political 
unit of Botswana? To do this, I look at the breakdown of tribal affiliation by district 
and rural/urban location. 
 
Firstly, Table 4.5a shows that majority tribes are evenly spread across the districts. 
However, their frequencies are much lower than the 90% suggested by the common 
wisdom. Secondly, minority tribes are equally spread across the various districts in 
the country. However, some of the minority tribes are concentrated in certain districts. 
For example, respondents who cite Mokalanga as their tribe are concentrated in the 
following districts: Lobatse (8%), Selebi-Phikwe & Gaborone (13% each), Central 
(25%) and Francistown (50%). Similarly, tribes such as Motswapong, Mmirwa and 
















Table 4.5a: Breakdown of Tribal Affiliation by District in Botswana in Percent 
Tribal Affiliation District Location Round 3 (2005) 
Majority Tribes   
Mongwato Central 34 
 Lobatse 4 
 Francistown 21 
 Selebi-Phikwe 6 
 South East 5 
 Kweneng 4 
 Gaborone 20 
Mokhurutshe Central 4 
 Francistown 2 
 Gaborone 1 
Mokwena Central 2 
 Lobatse 8 
 Jwaneng 13 
 Francistown 2 
 Selebi-Phikwe 3 
 South East 3 
 Kweneng 47 
 Gaborone 7 
Mokgatla Central 1 
 Lobatse 17 
 Francistown 2 
 Selebi-Phikwe 3 
 South East 3 
 Kweneng 11 
 Gaborone 15 
Mongwaketse Central 1 
 Lobatse 33 
 Jwaneng 50 
 Francistown 2 
 Selebi-Phikwe 16 
 South East 13 
 Kweneng 2 
 Gaborone 7 
Morolong Central 1 
 Lobatse 8 
 Francistown 2 
 Selebi-Phikwe 6 
 Kweneng <1 
 Gaborone 7 
Motawana Central 1 
 Francistown 5 
Motlokwa Central <1 
 Selebi-Phikwe 19 
 South East 15 
Molete Francistown 2 
 South East 45 
 Kweneng 10 
 Gaborone 6 
Minority Tribes   
Mokalanga Central 25 
 Lobatse 8 
 Francistown 50 
 Selebi-Phikwe 13 
 South East 3 
 Kweneng 5 
 Gaborone 13 
Motswapong Central 14 
 Jwaneng 13 
 Francistown 7 
 Selebi-Phikwe 28 
 South East 3 
 Kweneng 2 
 Gaborone 7 
Mmirwa Central 8 
 Francistown 4 
 Selebi-Phikwe 16 
 South East 3 












Mosarwa Central 3 
 Kweneng 1 
Mohurutshe Central 2 
 South East 3 
 Kweneng 4 
 Gaborone 6 
Mokgalagadi Central 2 
 Jwaneng 25 
 South East 3 
 Gaborone 4 
Monajwa Central 1 
Motalaote Central 1 
 Francistown 2 
Moherero Kweneng 1 
 Gaborone 1 
NB: < denotes less than      Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
Table 4.5b presents the summary of the distribution of minority tribes by district. It 
shows that the greatest concentration of minority tribes is in the following districts: 
Central (56%); Francistown (63%); Gaborone (35%); Selebi-Phikwe (57%); South 
East (15%) and Kweneng (13%). These findings disconfirm the common wisdom that 
largely sees Botswana as homogeneous and consisting of people of the same type. 
 
Table 4.5b: Distribution of Minority Tribes by District in Percent (2005) 






South East 15 
Lobatse 8 
Kweneng 13 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey data (Round 3) 
 
Table 4.6 show that in terms of rural/urban breakdown, majority tribes are more likely 
to be found in urban than rural areas. This pattern is reflected in the figures reported 
for the following significant majority tribes. These are: Mongwato (Urban 21% and 
Rural 12%), Mokgatla, Mokwena and Mongwaketse (Urban 11% and Rural 8% each). 
Generally, there are no significant differences with respect to the rural/urban 
distribution of minority tribes. The only notable exception is the respondents who cite 
Mokgalagadi as their tribe. These are more likely to be concentrated in rural (10%) 
than urban (3%) areas. On the whole, 36% and 49% of the respondents who belong to 
















Table 4.6: Breakdown of Tribal Affiliation by Rural/Urban Location in Botswana (Round 3, 2005) 
Tribal Affiliation Rural/Urban Location Percent 


























































































NB: < denotes less than     Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
In conclusion, the specific results presented in Table 4.4 together with the 
disaggregation of tribal affiliation, according to districts and rural-urban location 
(Tables 4.5 & 4.6), reveal the propensity of the respondents to identify themselves 
more in terms of their respective tribal affiliations, rather than other forms of ethnic 
identification. In addition, the distribution of minority tribes across the districts 
appears to be more widespread although they are some districts where these are 












distributed. Overall, these results are thus consistent with Hypothesis 2, where I 
predict that in terms of tribal affiliation, the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is 
higher than what the common wisdom suggests. In other words, these results do not 
support the common wisdom that perceives Botswana as consisting of 90% of the 
population belonging to majority tribes. 
 
4.4 Social Identity: A Subjective Dimension  
 
In Round 1, Afrobarometer the respondents are asked ―Besides being a citizen of 
Botswana which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?‖ The 
respondents‘ answers are summarized in Table 4.7. These results reveal that 44% of 
the respondents think of themselves primarily in terms of majority language(s)/tribe 
(s) dimension. A more or less equal number of 49% think of themselves in terms of 
minority language(s)/tribe(s). Very few of the respondents think of themselves in 
terms of: nationality i.e. Motswana (2%), Religion (2%), Race (3%), and Class & 
Occupation (3%). Based on the breakdown of language/tribe by district and 
rural/urban location as reflected in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.6, I can safely conclude 
that people who think of themselves in terms of minority language and tribal groups 
are evenly spread across the country. At the same time their distribution tends to be 
concentrated in certain districts more than others. Generally, this particular group also 
appears to be evenly distributed in terms of rural/urban location. 
 
Table 4.7: Social Identity in Botswana (1999) 
Primary Social Identity Round 1: 1999 (in Percent) 
Nationality:  
Motswana 2 






























































Class & Occupation  
Middle Class 1 
Working Class 1 
Farmer 1 








Young Person <1 
Region  
Moroka <1 
Don’t’ Differentiate Self 1 
Missing <1 
NB: < denotes less than     Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
Round 2 also asks the respondents ―Besides being a citizen of Botswana which 
specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?‖ The respondent‘s 
answers are summarized in Table 4.8). These results reveal that, the respondents 
generally identify themselves using various forms of ethnic identification such as: 
nationality; language/tribe/ethnic group; religion; race; class; occupation; age, gender, 
political party and region. For example, Table 4.8 reveals that a substantial number 
(42%) of respondents cite national identity as their primary social identity category. In 
addition, 27% of the respondents cite language/tribe/ethnic group as their social 












of religion (8%), class and occupation (6% each). As pointed earlier, it is not possible 
to disaggregate Round 2 data on social identity into specific language and tribal 
groups since these are not reflected in the data set as well as the code book. 
 
Table 4.8: Breakdown of Social Identity by Category in Botswana 
Social Identity Category Round 2: 2003 (in Percent) 
Won‘t Differentiate/National identity 42 










African/West African/Pan African <1 
Other 1 
Don‘t Know 5 
Refused <1 
NB: < denotes less than     Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
In short, Rounds 1 & 2 Afrobarometer survey data with respect to social identity 
generally support Hypothesis 3, where I predict that in using a more subjective 


































I start this chapter, by recapping the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4. In Hypothesis 1, I 
expect higher levels of heterogeneity in using language as a more objective dimension 
of ethnic identity. In Hypothesis 2 & 3, I also predict to find high levels of 
heterogeneity when using tribe (a putatively objective) and social identity (a more 
subjective) dimension of identity. These hypotheses are based on the common 
wisdom which suggests that Botswana is ethnically homogeneous and that 90% of the 
population speaks Setswana or belong to Setswana speaking tribes. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that the common wisdom is generally supported when language is used 
as a marker of ethnic identity. Analysis of Round 2 & 3 data reveal, the level of 
linguistic homogeneity is not as high as is suggested by the common wisdom. In fact, 
minority language/tribal groups appear to constitute a sizeable proportion of 
Botswana‘s total population. In addition it appears that minority language/tribal 
groups are not only widely distributed across the districts but are also in some 
instances concentrated in certain parts of the country. In using tribe and social 
identity, I also demonstrate lack of support for the common wisdom‘s prediction i.e. 
90% level of homogeneity. 
 
In the next three chapters I test the second part of the common wisdom about 
Botswana, that it has few politically relevant and divisive cleavage structures. This 
will involve examining the link between diversity and democratic stability as 
suggested by scholars of democratic governance. I use the dependent variables to 
explore the argument that since Botswana is moderately heterogeneous, it has no 
politically divisive cleavages. The variables that I use are: national identity, 
interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. Firstly, I 
select these dependent variables because these have never being used to explore 
political attitudes and behaviors in the context of Botswana.  
 
National identity is relevant as it allows me to tap into people‘s subjective and 












& Turner 1979: Huddy & Khatib 2007). Interpersonal trust as a fundamental element 
of social and political trust will help to explain trusting attitudes beliefs, values, 
behavioral orientations shaped by political socialization processes (Diamond 1994). 
Political participation helps to unpack the extent to which citizens actively take part in 
conventional and non-conventional forms of political involvement (Pye & Verba 
1965: Nie & Verba 1975; Bratton & Van De Walle 1997; Mattes 1999; Bratton, 
Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Finally, Government legitimacy reflects the extent to 
which citizens are aware of the need to abide by the decisions of those who are in 
authority irrespective of whether or not they agree with them or have voted into power 
the political incumbents (Easton 1975; Diamond 1994). 
 
5.2 Language and National Identity 
 
This section uses descriptive and inferential statistics to examine the strength of the 
relationship between language (independent variable), and national identity 
(dependent variable). It uses Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) & 3 (2005) of the 
Afrobarometer survey data.  
 
Using Round 1 data, I measure the level of national identity in Botswana with three 
batteries of questions. The results are presented in Table 5.1 and reveal that Batswana 
still have strong emotions often associated with national attachments. For instance, all 
(100%) the respondents who are coded as members of minority language group and 
96% of their majority counterparts say it makes them ―proud‖ to be called citizens of 
Botswana. Asked if they want their ―children to think of themselves as citizens of 
Botswana,‖ all (100%) the respondents who are coded as minority language group say 
yes. Almost all (96%) of their majority counterparts also answer in the affirmative. 
Similarly, a high (89% and 94%) number of Afrobarometer respondents coded as 
majority and minority language groups feel that ―all people who are born in this 
country, regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens 
of Botswana.‖ Finally, almost all (86% and 94%) the respondents who are coded as 
majority and minority language group respectively feel that ―it is desirable to create 













Overall, these results are consistent with the second part of the common wisdom that 
suggests that at the moment Botswana does not have any politically divisive cleavage 
structures. In other words, majority-minority language distinctions do not appear to 
make any meaningful differences on national identity sentiments. Thus Batswana 
(irrespective of their language group) still hold a high sense of citizenship and 
national identity. This means that these findings do not support Hypothesis 4, where I 
expect to find that people who belong to linguistic minority groups are less likely to 
be patriotic than their majority counterparts. 
 
Table 5.1: Relationship between Language and National Identity (1999-2005)20  
Dependent Variables  Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at 
Home/Home Language(s) 






Other Total (n) 
National Identity  
1999 
     























































All people who were born in this country, regardless of 
what group they belong to, should be treated as equal 





























It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the 
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2005      


























PANEL B: Inferential Statistics  
                                                 
20
 In the crosstabulation tables, I use collapsed dichotomous variables to present the data in an easy and 
straightforward manner. However the tables showing the Cramer‘s V scores reflect the statistical 













Dependent Variable: National Identity Independent Variable: Language: Cramer‘s V 
1999  
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana .036 
You want your children to think of themselves as citizens of 
Botswana 
.026 
All people who were born in this country, regardless of what 
group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of 
Botswana 
.037 
It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the\different 
groups who live in the country 
.050 
2003  
Choose between being a Motswana and being a….. .060 
2005  
Choose between being a Motswana and being a….. .140** 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Rounds 1, 2 & 3) 
 
In Round 2, I measure national identity using the question that asks the respondents 
what they would choose, national identity or group identity. Table 5.1 provides 
evidence that national identity is less frequent than group identity for majority and 
minority language groups. For example, very few (25% and 26%) of the respondents 
who are coded as majority and minority language groups respectively say they would 
choose national identity. In contrast, three quarters (74% and 75%) of minority and 
majority members respectively say they would choose group identity. Round 3 reveals 
higher levels of national attachments than group identity for minority and majority 
language groups. This is despite the fact that the respondents are asked the same 
question as in Round 2. The import of these findings also presented in Table 5.1 is 
that they are no differences in the manner in which the two language groups perceive 
national identity. For example, 77% and 86% of the respondents who are coded as 
minority and majority language groups respectively say they would choose national 
identity rather than group identity. 
 
Cramer‘s V tests (Rounds 1, 2 & 3) are used to discern the strength of the relationship 
between language and national identity. Table 5.1 reveals very weak and one 
moderate (.140) statistically significant relationship between language and national 
identity. The moderate score should be taken with caution since it may be driven by 
the single respondent who is coded as the ―Other‖ language category. These Cramer‘s 












that Botswana does not yet have any politically relevant cleavages that are aligned 
with national loyalty and sentiments. 
 
Basically, the findings for Round 1, 2 & 3 support the second part of the common 
wisdom and reconfirm the absence of politically relevant cleavage structures in 
Botswana. In other words, these findings do not support Hypothesis 4, where I predict 
low levels of patriotism among members of minority language groups. 
 
5.3 Language and Interpersonal Trust 
 
In Round 1, interpersonal trust is measured by asking respondents whether or not they 
would say ―people can be trusted or that you can‘t be too careful with people? Very 
low levels of trust are reported as reflected in Table 5.2. For instance, 14% and 17% 
of the respondents coded as majority and minority language group say that people can 
be trusted. In Round 3, I use a set of three questions to measure interpersonal trust. As 
Table 5.2 shows, two of the observed attitudes reveal generally high levels of 
interpersonal trust among both members of majority and minority language groups. 
The third observation reveals very low but comparable levels of trust among the two 
language groups. Specifically, 68% and 71% of majority and minority groups 
respectively say that they trust people from their own ethnic group. Furthermore, 64% 
and 65% of minority and majority groups say they trust Batswana from other ethnic 
groups. Asked if they would say that ―most people can be trusted or that you must be 
very careful in dealing with people,‖ very (5% and 6%) of minority and majority 






















Table 5.2: Relationship between Language and Interpersonal Trust (1999 & 2005) 
Dependent Variables  Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at Home/Home Language(s) 
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Majority Language Minority Language Other Total (n) 
Interpersonal Trust 
1999 
     
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 





























2005    
 
  
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 





















































































PANEL B: Inferential Statistics  
Dependent Variables: Interpersonal Trust Independent Variable: Language Cramer‘s V 
1999  
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can‘t be too careful in dealing with people? 
.041 
2005  
Most people can be trusted/must be very careful .023 
Trust people from your own ethnic group/tribe .045 
Trust Batswana from other ethnic groups .075 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1 & 3) 
 
Next, I use Cramer‘s V tests to establish the strength of the relationship between 
language and interpersonal trust. Table 5.2 reveals very weak relationship between 
language and interpersonal trust. The scores are consistent with the frequencies which 
also show comparable levels of trust for both minority and majority language groups. 
 
All these (Round 1 & 3) results point in the same direction that is; trusting attitudes 
are the same for both members of minority and majority language groups. This means 
that the majority-minority language distinction does not appear to influence trusting 
behavior and attitudes among members of minority and majority language groups. In 
other words, these findings do not support Hypothesis 5, where I predict that members 














5.4 Language, Political Participation and Voting 
 
In Round 1, six questions are used to measure conventional forms of political 
participation. The results are summarized in Table 5.3 and generally reveal low levels 
of political participation by both members of majority and minority language groups. 
For example, 22% and 28% of the respondents coded as minority and majority 
language groups respectively say they participated with others to address an important 
problem affecting the community or nation. Next, 39% and 40% of minority and 
majority group report to have attended an election rally in the past year. Only 6% 
percent each report has written a letter to a newspaper. Very few (10% and 11%) of 
majority and minority members say they worked for a political candidate or party 
officially. Lastly, 9% majority and none of minority members report to have contacted 
a government official or party official about some important problem. And the same 


















































Table 5.3: Relationship between Language, Political Participation and Voting (1999-2005) 
Dependent Variables  Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at Home/Home Language(s) 
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics  Majority Language Minority Language Other Total (n) 
Interpersonal Trust 
1999 
     
Participate with others to address an important problem 








































































































In the past year, have you contacted a government official 





























When you get together with your friends, would you say 





























With regard to the most recent, 1999 elections, which 
statement is true? 
Voted 



























2003      
Have you discussed politics with friends or neighbours in 



























































Have you got together with others to raise an issue during 





























Have you attended a demonstration or protest march during 
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PANEL B: Inferential Statistics  
Dependent Variables: Political Participation and Voting Independent Variable: Language 
Cramer‘s V 
1999  
Participate with others to address an important problem 
affecting the community or nation (other than an election) 
.048 
Attend an election rally? .037 
Work for apolitical candidate or party .040 
Write a letter to a newspaper .081* 
In the past year, have you contacted a government official 
about some important problem? 
.038 
When you get together with your friends, would you say you 
discuss political matters? 
.068* 
With regard to the most recent, 1999 elections, which 
statement is true? 
.080 
 2003 2004 
Discussed politics with friends or 
neighbors 
.049 NA 
Attended a community meeting .065 .072 
Raised an issue .065 .040 
Attended demonstration/protest march .036 .047 
Voted or not in 2004 national elections NA .070 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Rounds 1, 2 & 3) 
 
Regarding Round 2, three questions asked are based on conventional while the fourth 
is on non-conventional participation. First, respondents are asked if they have 
discussed politics with friends or neighbors in the past year. Close to half (49%) and 
44% of members of majority and minority say that they have done so. Asked if they 
have attended a community meeting in the past year, 63% and 71% of majority and 
minority members agree. And 67% and 70% of members of majority and minority 
language groups say that they get together with others to raise an issue. Finally, in 
terms of non-conventional participation, only 18% and 19% of members of majority 
and minority language group report to have attended a demonstration or protest march 
during the past year. 
 
In Round 3, I use two questions to measure conventional and one to measure 
nonconventional form of participation. A higher number (69% and 78%) of 












have attended a community meeting in the past year. More than half (56%) and 60% 
of those coded as majority and minority respectively day they have raised an issue 
when they get together with others. Regarding non-conventional form of participation, 
18% and 20% of majority and minority language group say they attended a 
demonstration or protest march in the past year. 
 
Although voting is one of the conventional forms of political participation, in this 
study, I treat it as a separate variable because of its uniqueness. As stated earlier, 
compared to other forms of conventional participation, voting is a complex and 
multistage process. It involves a series of steps such as registration, political 
mobilization and turnout to cast a vote on a polling day (Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; 
Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). In Round 1, voting is measured by asking 
respondents whether or not they voted in the 1999 elections. More than half (55%) 
and half (50%) of the respondents coded as majority and minority language group 
respectively, say that they voted in 1999. In Round 3, respondents are asked if they 
voted or not with regard to the 2004 national elections. Most (66% and 74%) of the 
respondents coded majority and minority group as members respectively, report to 
have voted in 2004.  
 
The findings reported above reveal that the minority-majority language distinction 
does not appear to induce any significant influence on voter turnout. In other words, 
voting patterns for both minority and majority language groups are more or less the 
same. Thus, these findings do not support Hypothesis 6 where I predict that members 
of minority are less likely to vote than the majority group. 
 
The Cramer‘s V tests used to determine the strength of the relationship between 
language and political participation reveal weak relationship between these two 
variables. As Table 5.3 shows the Cramer‘s V scores are generally weak. These set of 
scores underpin the fact that there are no significant differences in terms of political 
involvement for both members of minority and majority language groups. 
 
Taken together, Round 1, 2 & 3 results reveal similarities in the levels and patterns of 
civic involvement and unconventional participation by both members of majority and 












in any way results in differences with respect to the levels and the nature of political 
participation (including voting) in Botswana. This invariably means that these 
findings are not consistent with Hypothesis 6. That is, the expectation to find that 
members of minority language groups are more likely to engage in civic activities 
than their majority counterparts. 
 
5.5 Language and Government Legitimacy  
 
In Round 1, government legitimacy is measured by asking respondents whether or not 
their government ―has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by 
whether or not they agree with them.‖ The responses are summarized in Table 5.4. 
Half (50%) and 37% of the respondents coded as minority and majority language 
group respectively, agree with the statement. These findings are interesting as they 
reveal some differences in terms of the level of trust in political incumbents by 
majority and minority language groups. Members of minority language group appear 
to have slightly more faith than the majority group. This is an important finding 
although caution should be exercised given the small number (18) of respondents 










































Table 5 4: Relationship between Language and Government Legitimacy (1999 & 2005) 
Dependent Variables  Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at Home/Home Language(s) 
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics  Majority Language Minority Language Other Total (n) 
Government Legitimacy 
1999 
     
Our government has the right to make decisions that all 


































2005    
 
  
It is important to obey the government in power no matter 
who you voted for/it is not necessary to obey laws of 






























PANEL B: Inferential Statistics  
Dependent Variables: Government Legitimacy Independent Variable: Language 
Cramer‘s V 
1999  
Our government has the right to make decisions that all people 
have to abide by whether or not they agree with them 
.063 
2005  
Obey government in power/Not necessary to obey laws .048 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1 & 3) 
 
Round 3 asks respondents whether or not ―it is important to obey the government in 
power no matter who you voted for/it is not necessary to obey laws of government 
that I did not vote for.‖Most (90% each) of the respondents coded as majority and 
minority language group, agree with the statement. 
 
Like with previous variables, I use Cramer‘s V test to discern the strength of the 
relationship between language and legitimacy of government. Table 5.4 reveals weak 
relationship between language and government legitimacy. Again minority versus 
majority language differences do not seem to affect trusting attitudes. 
 
Overall, the findings of Round 1 (to a small extent) and Round 2 reveal that majority-
minority language distinction does not appear to influence attitudes towards 
government legitimacy. This means that Hypothesis 7 is not supported. Specifically, I 
expect that members of minority language group will be less likely to see the political 

















The findings presented in Chapter 4 generally do not support the first part of the 
common wisdom especially with regard to the level of tribal diversity. As highlighted 
in that chapter, the common wisdom suggests that Botswana consists primarily of 
Setswana speaking tribes. However, the findings reveal that the level of heterogeneity 
is much higher than the 90% threshold proposed by the common wisdom. In fact, the 
breakdown of tribal affiliation by district reveals that minority tribes are not only 
widely spread across the country but are also in some instances concentrated in certain 
parts of the country. 
 
In Chapter 6, I proceed by first asking: whether or not the diversity revealed with 
respect to tribal affiliation has any political consequences, in terms of politically 
divisive cleavages? I then use the same dependent variables (as used in Chapter 5) to 
test the second part of the common wisdom. That is, the argument that Botswana does 
not have politically relevant lines of ethnic divisions. 
 
6.2 Tribal Affiliation and National Identity 
 
I use Round 3 to measure the level of national identity in Botswana. Respondents are 
asked what choice they would make given national identity and group identity. Their 
responses are summarized in Table 6.1. Most (82% and 91%) of the respondents 
coded as minority and majority tribes respectively, say they would choose national 
identity.  
 
This means they are no substantial differences in the way in which the two tribal 
groups perceive national identity. Thus, majority-minority tribal differences do not 
seem to influence national attachments and sentiments in any meaningfully way. In 
this case, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. My expectation is that minority tribes are less 













Cramer‘s V test is used to determine the magnitude of the relationship between tribal 
affiliation and national identity. Table 6.1 reveals a very strong and statistically 
significant relationship (Cramer‘s V scores .440) between tribal affiliation and 
national identity. This high score is not very helpful when examined against the 
frequencies reflected in the same table. It appears to be driven by the fact that there is 
only one respondent who is coded as the ―Other‖ language category. 
 
Table 6.1: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation National Identity (2005) 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation 
 Majority Tribe Minority Tribe Motswana Only Total (n) 
National Identity 
PANEL A: Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
    
You had to choose being a 





























     
PANEL B: Inferential Statistics 
 Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer‘s V) 
 Dependent Variable: National Identity 
Choose between being a Motswana and 
being a….. 
.440** 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 













6.3 Tribal Affiliation and Interpersonal Trust 
 
A total of three questions are used to measure interpersonal trust. The results are 
presented in Table 6.2. First, respondents are asked to say whether or not ―most people 
can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people? Very few of the 
respondents (6% each) from minority and majority tribes agree with the statement. 
Asked how much they trust people from their own groups, 70% and 72% of majority 
and minority tribes respectively say yes. Lastly, when asked ―how much they trust 
Batswana from other ethnic groups,‖ the responses are substantial. For example, 65% 
and 66% of the respondents who are coded as majority and minority tribes respectively, 
say that they trust Batswana from other ethnic groups. 
 
Table 6.2: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation and Interpersonal Trust (2005) 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation 
 Majority Tribe Minority Tribe Motswana Only Total (n) 
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics 
Interpersonal Trust     
Would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you must 







































How much do you trust people 

































How much do you trust 


































PANEL B: Inferential Statistics 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
 Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer‘s V) 
Dependent Variable: Interpersonal Trust  
 Most people can be trusted/must be very careful .067 
Trust people from your own ethnic group/tribe .080 













Next, Cramer‘s V tests are used to establish the strength of the relationship between 
tribal affiliation and interpersonal trust. Table 6.2 reveals weak relationship between 
tribal affiliation and interpersonal trust. In other words, tribal differences do not seem to 
influence trusting attitudes. 
 
Finally, apart from the fact that the responses to one of the questions asked demonstrate 
very low levels of trust for both tribal groups, nevertheless, their levels of trust are 
generally comparable. The two groups seem to display more or less the same levels of 
trusting behavior. Hence, the minority-majority tribal distinction does not appear to 
differ along tribal affiliation dimension. This means that Hypothesis 5 is not supported 
since I expect to find that members of majority tribes are more likely to display low 
trusting attitudes than minority tribes. 
 
6.4 Tribal Affiliation, Political Participation and Voting 
. 
Two questions based on conventional and one on non-conventional political activity is 
used to measure political participation. The responses are summarized in Table 6.3. 
Asked if they attended a community meeting in the past year, 69% and 73% of the 
respondents coded as majority and minority tribes respectively, say they have done so. 
When asked if they had raised an issue when they get together with others, more than 
half (56% and 57%) of the respondents coded as minority and majority tribes 
respectively, responded in the affirmative. Asked about their involvement in non-
conventional participation, few (15% and 20%) of the respondents coded as majority 
and minority tribes respectively, say that they attended a demonstration or protest 
march in the past year. 
 
With regard to voting, respondents are asked whether or not they voted in 2004 national 
elections. Table 6.3 reveals that most (67% each) of the respondents belonging to 
minority and majority tribes, report that they voted. Voter turnout for both tribes is 
comparable. Thus minority-majority tribal distinctions do not appear to influence voter 
turnout. Hence, Hypothesis 5 is not supported where I predict that in terms of voting, 














Table 6.3: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation, Political Participation and Voting (2005) 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation 
 Majority Tribe Minority Tribe Motswana Only Total (n) 
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics 
Political Participation 
 
    
Have you attended a community 






























Have you got together with 







































Have you attended a 
demonstration or protest march 


































With regard to the most recent, 
2004 national elections, which 
statement is true for you? 
Voted 































PANEL B: Inferential Statistics 
 Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer‘s V) 
Dependent Variable: Political 
Participation 
 
1. Attended a community meeting .055 
2. Raised an issue .091** 
3. Attended demonstration/protest march .106** 
4. Voted or not in 2004 national 
elections 
.072 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
I then use Cramer‘s V tests to establish the strength of the relationship between tribal 
affiliation and political participation. According to Table 6.3, two of the relationships 
are weak; one is weak yet statistically significant and another strong and statistically 
significant. Taken together, these scores demonstrate the fact that differences do exist 
in terms of the extent to which members of majority and minority tribes engage in 
political activities. However, these differences are moderate and do not translate into 














On the whole, first they are some disparities (for both groups though) in the levels of 
conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation. Second, 
conventional and non-conventional participation levels for minority and majority tribes 
are similar. That is, majority-minority tribal distinctions do not seem to run parallel to 
the levels of political participation. These results are not consistent with Hypothesis 6 
where I predict that members of minority tribes are more likely to engage in civic 
activities than majority tribes. 
 
6.5 Tribal Affiliation and Government Legitimacy  
 
In measuring government legitimacy, Afrobarometer respondents are asked if ―it is 
important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for/it is not 
necessary to obey laws of a government that I did not vote for.‖  The responses are 
summarized in Table 6.4. Most (90% each) of the respondents coded as majority and 
minority tribes, agree with the statement. In other words, both groups attach the same 
levels of faith and trust on political incumbents.  
 
Table 6.4: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation and Government Legitimacy (2005) 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation 
 
 Majority Tribe Minority Tribe Motswana Only Total (n) 
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Legitimacy of Government 
 
    
It is important to obey the 
government in power no matter 
who you voted for/It is not 
necessary to obey laws of 














































PANEL B: Inferential Statistics 
 Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer‘s V) 
Dependent Variable: Legitimacy of Government  
Obey government in power / Not necessary to obey laws .114** 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3) 
 
Cramer‘s V test is used to discern the strength of the relationship between tribal 
affiliation and legitimacy of government. Table 6.4 reveals a strong and statistically 













power/not necessary to obey laws. Generally, members of minority and majority tribes 
perceive government legitimacy in more or less the same manner. 
 
Lastly, these findings imply that majority-minority tribal differences do not influence 
Batswana‘s attitudes towards the political leadership. Finally, Hypothesis 7 is not 
supported, where I expect that minority tribes will be less likely to see the political 

















































Chapter 4 revealed high levels of diversity when using social identity, a more 
subjective marker of ethnic identity. In contrast, the common wisdom posits that 90% 
of Botswana‘s population is ethnically homogenous. I tested the common wisdom and 
found that more or less the same (44% and 49%) proportion of the respondents think of 
themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribe respectively. It is also 
demonstrated that few of the respondents think of themselves in terms of religion, race 
or class/occupation. This implies that generally the level of heterogeneity in Botswana 
is higher than anticipated by the common wisdom. 
 
Chapter 7 builds on these findings to explore the second part of the common wisdom 
regarding political cleavage in Botswana. But first, I test whether the diversity found 
with regard to social identity has any political consequences, in terms of politically 
divisive cleavages. Like in Chapters 5 & 6, I use the same set of dependent variables to 
test the arguments about political cleavages in Botswana. The only difference is that in 
this chapter, I use social identity which I consider to be more subjective than other 
markers of ethnic identity such as language and tribal affiliation. 
 
7.2 Social Identity and National Identity 
 
This section presents the results of Round 1 & 2 separately because as I pointed earlier 
these measure the relationship between social identity and the dependent variables in a 
somewhat different ways. For example, for Round 1 data it is possible to breakdown 
language into minority and majority language/tribe categories. This process is not 
possible because of the broad categories (language/tribe) used. Even the codebook does 
not provide for the breakdown of language and tribe into minority and majority social 













relevant to my general hypotheses. In contrast, Round 1 results are more relevant to the 
specific hypotheses. 
 
Firstly, in Round 1, four batteries of questions are used to explore the relationship 
between social identity and national identity. The results are summarized in Table 7.1. 
First, respondents are asked whether or not it makes them proud to be called citizens of 
Botswana. Almost all (97% each) of the respondents who think of themselves in terms 
of minority and majority language/tribe say that it makes them proud. Second, 
respondents are asked if they want their children to think of themselves as citizens of 
Botswana. A very high (97% and 98%) of respondents who think of themselves in 
terms of majority and minority social group agree with the statement. Third, 
respondents are asked if they want ―all children who were born in this country 
regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of 
Botswana.‖ An overwhelming (88% and 89%) number of respondents, who think of 
themselves in terms of majority and minority social group respectively, agree with the 
statement. A similarly high proportion of respondents from both groups say that ―it is 
desirable to create one united out of all the different groups who live in Botswana.‖  
 
Table 7.1. Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity (1999) 
Dependent Variables: Independent Variable: Social Identity 
 Majority Language/tribe Minority  
Language/Tribe 
Other Total (n) 
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics 
National Identity 
 
    
It makes you proud to be called a 






You want your children to think of 






All children who were born in this 
country regardless of what group 
they belong to, should be treated as 






It is desirable to create one united 
nation out of all the different groups 









































































































































PANEL B: INFERENTIAL STATISTICS (1999) 
 Independent Variable: Social Identity (Cramer‘s V) 
Dependent Variable: National Identity  
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana .092* 
You want your children to think of themselves as citizens of 
Botswana 
.099** 
All children who were born in this country regardless of what 
group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of 
Botswana 
.054 
It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the different 
groups who live in Botswana 
.046 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01          * statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1) 
 
I then use a set of four Cramer‘s V to discern the magnitude of the relationship between 
social identity and national identity. Table 7.1 reveals two weak and two moderately 
weak yet statistically significant relationships. Examined alongside the frequencies of 
the crosstabulation between social identity and national identity (also presented in 
Table 7.1), these results, underpin the fact that generally social identity differences do 
not seem to run parallel to national attachments and sentiments in Botswana. 
 
Secondly, Round 3 asks the respondents what they would choose, national identity or 
group identity. The results are summarized in Table 7.2. These reveal that 47% of the 
respondents who think of themselves in terms of language/tribe say that they are more 
likely to choose national identity than group identity. These results are consistent with 
the general aspect of Hypothesis 8, where I predict a weak relationship between social 
identity and national identity. 
 
Table 7.2. Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity (2003) 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Social Identity 
 Language/Tribe Motswana Only Other Total (n) 
National Identity 
 
    
You had to choose being a 











































In sum, using Round 1 results in particular, they appears to be no differences in the 
manner in which people who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority 
language/tribe perceive national identity. The social distinctions between Batswana 
who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribe do not appear 
to correspond with national attachments and sentiments. These findings are consistent 
with Hypothesis 8, where I predict that Batswana who think of themselves in terms of 
majority and minority language/tribe/ethnic group are more likely to attach equal 
amount of loyalty to the nation state. 
 
7.3 Social Identity and Interpersonal Trust 
 
Round 1 measures interpersonal trust by asking that: ―would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can‘t be too careful in dealing with people?‖ The results are 
presented in Table 7.3. These reveal very low levels of trust for both groups. For 
example, only 14% of respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority and 
majority language/tribe respectively, say they agree with the statement. Cramer‘s V test 
is used to determine the magnitude of the relationship between social identity and 
interpersonal trust. Table 7.3 reveals a very weak relationship (Cramer‘s V score of 
.033) between these two variables. 
 
Table 7.3: Relationship between Social Identity and Interpersonal Trust in Percent (1999) 
Dependent Variables  Independent Variable: Social Identity 







Other Total (n) 
Interpersonal Trust 
1999 
     
Would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you can‘t be too 





























PANEL B: Inferential Statistics  
Dependent Variable: Interpersonal Trust Independent Variable: Language: Cramer‘s V 
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can‘t 
be too careful in dealing with people? 
.033 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01       * statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1) 
 
It can thus be concluded that the distinction between majority-minority language/tribe 













Batswana who think of themselves in terms of both majority and minority 
language/tribal/ethnic group are equally likely to discriminate members of out-groups. 
 
7.4 Social Identity, Political Participation and Voting 
 
In all six batteries of questions are used to measure conventional forms of political 
participation in Round 1. Generally, participation levels are low. First, respondents are 
asked whether or not they have contacted a government official or party official about 
some important problem in the past year. Very few (5% and 9%) of the respondents 
who think of themselves in terms of minority and majority language/tribe respectively 
report to have made political contact. And the same applies to writing a letter to a 
newspaper. When asked if they have worked for a political candidate, 10% and 11% of 
majority and minority social group respectively say that they have done so. Asked if 
they participated with others to address an important problem affecting the community, 
24% and 28% of minority and majority social identity group say that they did. Few 
(37% and 43%) of the respondent who think of themselves in terms of majority and 
minority social group respectively, report to have attended an election rally in the past 
year. Lastly, half (50% and 51%) of the respondents belonging to minority and majority 
social groups respectively, say that they discuss political matters when they get together 
with friends. 
 
Table 7.4: Relationship between Social Identity, Political Participation and Voting in Percent (1999) 
Dependent Variables  Independent Variable: Social Identity 






Other Total (n) 
Political Participation and Voting 
1999 
     
In the past year, have you contacted a government 


































When you get together with friends, would you say 





























Have you engaged in this activity or not? Participate 
with others to address an important problem 










































715 262 172 1143 






























Have you engaged in this activity or not? Work for 





























Have you engaged in this activity or not? Write a 































     
With regard to the recent, 1999 national elections, 
which statement is true for you? 
Voted 



























PANEL B: Inferential Statistics 
 Independent variable: Social Identity 
Dependent Variable: Political Participation 
Contacted government official or political party official .082* 
Got together with friends to discuss political matters .082 
Participated with others to address an important problem 
affecting the community (other than an election) 
.048 
Attended an election rally .045 
Worked for a political candidate .062 
Wrote a letter to a newspaper .056 
Voted or not in the 1999 national elections .038 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01       * statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1) 
 
Voting (in Round 1) is measured by asking the respondents whether or not they voted 
in the 1999 national elections. The results are presented in Table 7.4. In fact, slightly 
more than half of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority 
language tribe say that they voted. More than half (56%) of majority social group also 
report to have voted in the 1999 elections. These results generally show that majority-
minority language/tribe distinction does not matter politically. Voter turnout patterns 
for both social groups are comparable. The findings are not consistent with Hypothesis 
10, where I predict that members who think of themselves in terms of majority 














In order to ascertain whether to confirm or disconfirm Hypothesis 10, seven Cramer‘s 
V tests are used to discern the relationship between social identity and political 
participation. Table 7.4 reveals moderately weak, yet statistically significant 
relationship for: contacting government or party official (Cramer‘s V score of .082); 
discussion of political matters (Cramer‘s V score of .082) and attendance of election 
rally (Cramer‘s V score of .045); and participation in addressing an important problem 
(Cramer‘s V score of .048). The other three Cramer‘s V scores (.062 for working for a 
political candidate, .056 for writing a letter to a newspaper and .038 for voting), reveal 
weak relationship between social identity and political participation.  
 
In Round 2, four questions are used to measure conventional forms while one is used to 
measure non-conventional political participation. The results are summarized in Table 
7.5. When asked if they discussed politics with neighbors in the past year, more (57%) 
and 42% of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of language/tribe say 
they agree. Three quarter (71%) say that they attended a community meeting. Another 
three quarter (71%) of respondents report to raise an issue when they get together with 
others. When asked about participation in non-conventional activities, very few (12%) 
of the respondents say that they attended a demonstration or protest march in the past 
year. 
 
Lastly, a substantial (65%) of respondents who think of themselves in terms of 
language/tribe say that they voted in 2004. On the whole Round 2 results are somewhat 
consistent with the general Hypothesis 10 made with respect to the relationship 
between social identity, political participation and voting. I make a prediction of a 
strong relationship between the type of social identity, political participation and 
voting. Although these results are not very helpful in testing the argument about the 
second part of the common wisdom, yet at the same time, they demonstrate the possible 
link between language/tribe dimension and the dependent variables explored thus far. 



















Table 7.5. Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity (2003) 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Social Identity 
 




    
Have you discussed politics with 





























Have you attended a community 





























Have you got together with others to 





























Have you attended a demonstration 


































With regard to the most recent, 
2004 national elections, which 
statement is true for you? 
Voted 































Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 2) 
 
In conclusion, Round 1 results in particular, reveal variations in the frequencies of 
political participation across the various forms of conventional political activities. In 
spite of these variations, participation levels for respondents who think of themselves in 
terms of minority and majority language/tribe are comparable. Both social groups 
display more or less the same amount of political participation in each of the categories 
that are measured. In short, majority-minority language/tribe distinctions do not appear 
to correspond with the levels of political participation. These findings are consistent 
with Hypothesis 10, where I predict the level of civic political participation will be the 
same for both minority and majority language/tribal groups. 
 
7.5 Social Identity and Government Legitimacy  
 
Round 1 measures government legitimacy by asking if the ―government has the right to 













The results are presented in Table 7.6. These reveal low (35% and 37%) levels of 
government legitimacy for the respondents who think of themselves in terms of 
minority and majority language/tribe respectively. Cramer‘s V test is used to establish 
the strength of the relationship between social identity and government legitimacy. 
Table 7.6 reveals a weak relationship (Cramer‘s V score of .073) between social 
identity and government legitimacy. 
 
Table 7.6: Relationship between Social Identity and Government Legitimacy in Percent (1999) 
Dependent Variables  Independent Variable: Social Identity 










     
Our government has the right to make decisions that all 


































PANEL B: Inferential Statistics (1999) 
 Independent Variable: Legitimacy of Government (Cramer‘s V) 
Dependent Variable: Legitimacy of Government  
Government has right to make decisions that all have to abide 
by whether or not they agree with them 
.073 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01    * Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1) 
 
Round 2 asks a slightly different question measuring government legitimacy. It asks 
respondents whether or not ―it is important to obey the government in power no matter 
who you voted for/it is not necessary to obey laws of government that I did not vote 
for.‖ The results are summarized in Table 7.7. Most (90%) of the respondents who 
think of themselves in terms of language/tribe agree with the statement. These results 
are consistent with the general (Hypothesis 11) prediction that they will be a strong 
relationship between the type of social identity and the level of government legitimacy. 
 
Table 7.7. Relationship between Social Identity and Government Legitimacy (2003) 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Social Identity 
 
 Language/Tribe Motswana Only Other Total (n) 
Legitimacy of Government     
 
It is important to obey the 
government in power no matter 
who you voted for/It is not 
necessary to obey laws of 






























































Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 2) 
 
Specifically, Round 1 results reveal that there are no substantial differences in the way 
in which respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority-majority 
language/tribe perceive government legitimacy. Finally, these findings are not 
consistent with Hypothesis 11, where I predict that people who think of themselves in 
terms of minority social groups are less likely to see the political system as legitimate. 
 
In conclusion, Chapter 7 demonstrates that, the selected dependent variables (i.e. 
national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government 
legitimacy) do not translate into politically meaningful and relevant cleavage structures 
in Botswana. Majority-minority social identity differences do not run parallel to 
political behaviours and attitudes. Both members of majority and minority 
language/tribes display similar patterns of attitudes in terms of national loyalty, social 
and political trust, conventional and unconventional forms of political involvement and 






























8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1 Summary of Main Findings 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that Botswana is not as nearly homogeneous as the first aspect 
of the common wisdom suggests, especially if one moves beyond language and looks at 
other indicators such as tribe and social identity. With regard to language, a more 
objective dimension of ethnicity, Round 1 findings reveal the predominance (90% and 
above) of Setswana as the language ―spoken most at home‖ in Botswana. Thus the first 
part of the common wisdom is disconfirmed. Yet in spite of the predominance of 
Setswana, especially using Round 2 & 3 which asks about the ―home language,‖ the 
results are somewhat different. The proportion of the respondents who use Setswana as 
the ―home language‖ drops to 79%, a figure that falls far short when compared to 90% 
suggested by the common wisdom. In fact, 21% and 23% of the respondents sampled in 
Round 2 & 3 respectively report to use minority languages as their ―home language.‖ In 
fact, the breakdown of language by districts and rural-urban divide reveals that some of 
the minority languages like Sekalanga and Sekgalagadi are widely spread across the 
country. And at the same time minority language groups appear to be concentrated in 
certain parts of the country. In short, the common wisdom is supported when one uses 
language ‗spoken most at home‖ and is not supported when one uses ―home language.‖ 
 
In terms of tribal affiliation, a putatively objective dimension of ethnic identity, the 
results reveal that the level of diversity in Botswana is much higher than that 
contemplated by the common wisdom. In fact, the disaggregation of tribal affiliation 
according to district and urban-rural location reveals widespread distribution of 
minority tribes across the country. These are not simply tucked away in remote and 
peripheral areas. 
 
The use of social identity, a more subjective dimension of ethnic identity, reveals that 
the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is much higher than the common wisdom wants 
us to believe. People who think of themselves in terms of ―minority‖ languages or 














Chapters 5 to 7 show that potential cleavages along minority-majority language 
divisions, minority-majority tribal affiliation and minority-majority social groupings do 
not make much difference across a series of important political attitudes and behaviors. 
That is there are few politically divisive cleavage lines at least in terms of language, 
tribe and social identity. These lines of cleavages do not seem to correspond to national 
identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. 
The existing cleavages do not appear to have been politicized. Thus, the second part, 
and perhaps the more implicit part of the common wisdom about Botswana appears to 
be correct.  
 
8.2 Implications for Theory and Future Research  
 
Several implications for theory arise out of this study. The results reveal that Botswana 
is ethnically more diverse than the common wisdom suggests. This is particularly true 
once tribal affiliation (a putatively objective dimension) and social identity (a more 
subjective dimension) are used as markers of ethnic identity. Minority groups do not 
appear to hold different political attitudes to majority groups. The crucial question that 
arises then is: why are the many observed differences in language, tribe, or in social 
identity not marked by important value, attitudinal or behavioral differences? The 
answer to this question would seem to lie at the basis of Botswana‘s exceptionality, not 
its absolute levels of homogeneity.  
 
The following factors may possibly explain why political cleavages in Botswana are 
not yet politicized. First, there seems to be an absence of political entrepreneurs. The 
‗ethnic card‘ effect is not yet visible in Botswana‘s politics. Even political parties are 
inclusive and all embracing in their quest to campaign for political and state power. 
Second, Botswana‘s economic growth and the prudent use and equitable distribution of 
national wealth and this means ethnic minorities have little reason to be dissatisfied 
with the performance of the political regime.  
 
The small population size, widespread distribution and concentration of minority 
groups in certain parts of the country makes difficult for them to forge alliances along 













Botswana Democratic Party has traditionally used inclusive strategies thus moves away 
from ethnic appeals and political mobilization. For the time being Setswana plays the 
role of lingua franca thus forms the basis for unifying political attitudes and behaviors 
in Botswana. However, differences in the ―minority‖ and ―majority‖ group perceptions 
of languages spoken most at home and home language are apparent. These may lead to 
rising demand for ―home language‖ education by minority groups. In future, opposition 
parties may see minority groups as the basis for ethnic political mobilization. 
 
Finally, the lack of observed politicization of Botswana‘s identity cleavages should not 
be taken for granted. Ignoring issues of unequal distribution of political power, rising 
levels of poverty, escalating income inequalities and high unemployment rates may be 
counterproductive in the long run. These issues if not adequately tackled, may provide a 
seedbed for political instability and ethnic-based politics. Evidence already exists to 
support this insinuation. According to Solway (2002: 713), the Botswana case presents 
a paradox - - prosperity and ―yet despite these realities, we see the rapid and 
increasingly vociferous rise of ethnically based consciousness and demands.‖ The 
establishment of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (commonly known as ‗the 
Balopi Commission‘), in 2000, is indicative of the fact that Botswana‘s ethnic politics 
is gradually being politicized. Its establishment was the result of a combination of 
complex factors that had permeated Botswana‘s political landscape since independence 
in 1966. 
 
A number of probable factors can be used to explain why the government eventually 
gave into the demands to review Sections 77, 78 & 79 of Botswana‘s constitution that 
was adopted at the independence. First, these sections were perceived to be 
discriminatory in that they listed the eight principal Tswana tribes and language groups 
but were silent on the existence of the non-Tswana groups. Second, ethnic minorities 
largely perceived the constitution as not only imposed by the colonial administration in 
concert with ethnic majorities but also as an instrument of subordinating them thus 
perpetuating inequalities particularly with respect to tribal land ownership. For 
example, the constitution provides for Tribal Territories under the custodianship of the 
eight Tswana tribes. Theoretically, every Motswana is entitled to own land anywhere in 













of which are named after the eight Tswana tribes—for example, Ngwato Landboard 
(named after Bangwato), Tawana Landboard (named after Batawana) and Kweneng 
Landboard (named after Bakwena). Thirdly, the marginalizations of ethnic minority 
languages from use in public forums such government offices, education and the 
judiciary complicates the relative uneasiness between ethnic minorities and majorities. 
It is against this background and a result of the mounting pressure and dissatisfaction 
by ethnic minorities that the government was eventually forced to establish the Balopi 
Commission of inquiry in 2000. The government embarked on a narrow mandate for 
the commission to focus specifically on making Sections 76,77 & 78 tribally neutral 
and making the composition of the House of Chiefs more broad to embrace ethnic 
minorities. Yet the demands and expectations of ethnic minorities were and are still 
much broader. In fact, there is a perception that the recommendations of the Balopi 
Commission, the subsequent adoption of the Government White Paper and the 
amendments effected do not go far enough to address the key issues raised by ethnic 
minorities. In the short term, ethnic minorities have settled for the compromise but the 
politicization of ethnicity is likely to become more salient and persistent and create a 
wedge between ethnic groups if Botswana‘s policies of nation building remain less 
accommodative in character thus undermining peaceful co-existence between the 
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